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I. INTRODUCTION
Juvenile crime is one of the most challenging domestic problems
facing our country today. Nationwide, the juvenile violent crime arrest
rate has escalated during the past decade, reaching its highest level in
1990.1 In particular, the juvenile crime arrest rate in Florida jumped
fifty-three percent between 1986 and 1991.2 As a result, Florida has the
third highest rank in the nation for juvenile crime arrests.
Numerous factors have been considered to cause juvenile delin-
1. In 1990, (the most current year for which statistics were available at this writing), per
100,000 juvenile arrests, 430 were for violent crimes such as murder, forcible rape, robbery and
aggravated assault. This represents a 27% increase over 1980 figures. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REP. 279 (1992).
2. Wilda L. White, Survey. Florida Failing its Kids, MIAN HERALD, Mar. 29, 1993, at IA
(citing 1993 KIDS CoUNT (1993)). This study evaluated the well-being of children both
nationwide and state-by-state in 10 categories. Florida ranked below the national average in each
of the 10 categories, which included family stability, educational achievement, health,
employment, and safety. In 1992, Florida was 43rd in the study. In 1993, the state ranked 45th
among the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Id.
3. Id. In addition, two recent reports have ranked Florida among the worst places for crime
and safety, and have claimed that Florida's justice system leads the nation in its disarray. Florida
Ranked Among Worst in Crime, Justice, SuN SENTINEL, Feb. 1, 1994, at 7A.
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quency.4 Many believe that it is tied to social forces.' For example,
rising poverty and unemployment rates have contributed to creating an
economic environment that has become more difficult and competitive.6
In addition, society has experienced the breakdown of families, schools
and other social institutions. Finally, gun and drug use have increased
among our country's youth, creating an environment which fosters juve-
nile crime.'
Others suggest the government's failure to fund adequate programs,
despite available funds, exacerbates juvenile delinquency. 9 For exam-
ple, Former House Speaker Tom Gustafson pushed the Florida Legisla-
ture in 1990 to approve a fifty-one million dollar juvenile justice
program.'0 The legislation's primary focus was to provide long-term
rehabilitation for troubled juveniles by opening new beds in residential
treatment programs, halfway houses and wilderness camps." These
4. Larry Barszewski, Many Factors at Root of Teen Violence, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 1994,
at 1 OA (citing reasons such as single parent homes, lack of moral guidance from elders, and
exposure to violence on television and in the movies).
5. BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE ix-x (1993).
6. Id. at ix. See also Linda Kleindienst & Diane Hirth, Youth Violence on Rise, Kids Joke
About Juvenile Justice System, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 17, 1993, at IA ("The number of children
living in poverty has continued to grow over the decades. Unemployment remains high among
juveniles-especially poor youth.").
7. See Mike Folks, Youth Court New Venue for Judge Lindsey, Must Work With New
Restrictions, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 6, 1994, at IB (paraphrasing juvenile court Judge Lindsey,
"[tihe increase in juvenile crime can't be attributed to one factor.., juvenile crime can be linked
to the breakdown of families, the lack of responsible role models, peer pressure or drugs."); see
also 1993 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 25 (noting that in 1990, 65.7% of the children under 18 lived
in a two-parent, married household; 22.5% lived in single-parent households; 11.8% lived in a
household headed by neither parent).
8. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REP. 279
(1992) (citing that during the past decade there has been a 79% increase in the number ofjuveniles
who commit murders with guns. In 1990, three out of four juvenile murder offenders used guns to
commit their crimes and, since 1980, the juvenile arrest rate trends for weapons law violations and
heroin/cocaine violations have paralleled the trend for murder); see also Drug Use by Youths on
the Rise, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 1, 1994, at IA ("In 1993, 9 percent of 8th graders had smoked
marijuana, 19 percent of 10th graders and 26 percent of 12th graders.").
9. Report Reveals Crisis For Kids In Florida, MIAMI HERALD, April 24, 1993 at 2B.
Florida, ranking 19th in per-capita income, is not a poor state. Id. See also Jim Clark, Real
Institutional Change is Needed Juvenile Justice Let's Get Smarter, Not Just Tougher, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 7, 1994, at 15A.
10. Peter Mitchell, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June 3, 1990, at B3.
11. Regarding legislative intent for the Serious or Habitual Juvenile Offender program
proposed in 1990, see FLA. STAT. § 39.002(5)(a) (1993):
Florida's juvenile justice system has an inadequate number of beds for serious or
habitual juvenile offenders and an inadequate number of community and residential
programs for a significant number of children whose delinquent behavior is due to
or connected with illicit substance abuse. In addition, a significant number of
children have been adjudicated in adult criminal court and placed in Florida's
prisons where programs are inadequate to meet their rehabilitative needs and where
space is needed for adult offenders.
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programs would have had varied security levels, creating a continuum
based on the particular needs of individual youths balanced with the
security risk to the public.' 2 The proposal passed and was to take effect
upon the completion of the program facilities.13 However, when tax rev-
enues fell due to the recession, these juvenile programs were not imple-
mented despite the public's cry for reform. 14
As a result of the increase in juvenile crime arrest rates and the
problem of inadequate funding, the Florida Juvenile Justice System has
been in constant flux. The desire for change has led the Florida Juvenile
Justice System to go full circle, from prosecution of juveniles as adults
in criminal courts, through adjudication and sentencing in a separate
noncriminal system, and finally to the present practice of prosecuting
and sentencing some juveniles in the adult system. Considering the
mechanisms that are currently available under the Florida Juvenile Jus-
tice Act' 5 to prosecute and sentence juveniles as adults, in addition to
the considerable amount of discretion that has been given to prosecu-
tors,' 6 and the statutes that the legislation has created which circumvent
both prosecutors and juvenile court judges, 7 it may be argued that,
although the age of majority is eighteen,' 8 Florida has structured its sys-
tem so that fourteen-year-old juveniles are treated as adults. Conse-
quently, the rehabilitative juvenile justice system has gradually
disappeared."
Many scholars argue that a need for a separate juvenile justice sys-
tem no longer exists.20 They believe that as a result of provisions such
12. Ch. 90-208, Laws of Fla. (1990). Nonsecure detention is an example of a new program
that was to have been funded. This is an alternative for children who are permitted to be on home
detention but do not have a viable home for release. Id. § 3, at 1089-90. Another proposal was
the creation of a serious or habitual juvenile offender program. This was to have combined 9 to
12 months of intensive secure residential treatment with a minimum of 9 months of after-care.
The program was to have included job training, placement and employability training skills. Id.
§ 5.
13. Ch. 90-208, §§ 21, 22, Laws of Fla. (1990).
14. Many Floridians supported the decision of legislators to spend more money on juvenile
crime. Some editorial headlines include: Prevention is Better-Help Juveniles Before They
Become Career Criminals, LAKELAND LEDGER, May 17, 1990; Kids Need More Than Prison-
There's Still a Chance to Help Young Offenders, FT. MYERS NEWSPREss, May 14, 1990; Youth
Rehabilitation Can Pay Off by Cutting down on Adult Criminals, SUN SENTINEL, May. 7, 1990;
Fixing Juvenile Justice, A System Out of Control, GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 13, 1989.
15. FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1993).
16. See infra part III.A.2(a)(b).
17. See infra part III.A.3.
18. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(7)(a) (1993).
19. See infra part II.A for a general review on the history of the juvenile court. See generally
ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY, (1977); Sanford J.
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970);
FREDERIC L. FAUST & PAUL J. BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY (1979).
20. See discussion infra part IV. See generally Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood
1994]
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as those available in Florida courts,2 1 the legal victories that were
achieved on behalf of juveniles in the 1960s and 1970s, 22 and the
increase in juvenile violent crime arrest rates,23 the system has outlived
its usefulness.
This Comment focuses primarily on the Florida Juvenile Justice
System, which grants prosecutors and judges broader dispositional pow-
ers than those granted in many other states.24 Part II of this Comment
explores the origin and development of the juvenile justice system
nationally and in Florida. Part III highlights the mechanisms used to
bypass the juvenile courts and send juveniles into adult courts, and
focuses on the concerns that this creates. Part IV analyzes the criticisms
of the juvenile justice system and the argument for its abolishment.
This Comment concludes that the serious and escalating problem of
youth violence deserves a serious response. Proposed "get-tough" meas-
ures, however, do not provide the answer. Measures which make it eas-
ier to try juveniles as adults are inconsistent with the original philosophy
of a juvenile justice system that recognizes that juvenile offenders can
and should be rehabilitated. Proponents of "get-tough" measures believe
that the criminal justice system can, by itself, solve the complex
problems of juvenile crime and violence.
In response, this Comment suggests that "get-smart" measures are
more appropriate. "Get-smart" measures recognize that the juveniles
who are committing violent crimes often come from impoverished
households, live in substandard housing and have inadequate, if any,
and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L.
REv. 1083 (1991) (arguing that since society's current view of the nature of adolescence no longer
comports with the turn of the century view that originally shaped the creation of the juvenile court,
the ideological legitimacy of a separate court for juveniles is now undermined); Katherine H.
Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposalfor the Preservation of Children's Legal
Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990) (arguing that abolishing juvenile court will guarantee that
those charged with violating the law will receive both constitutional and statutory protections);
Barry Feld, Juvenile (In) Justice and the Criminal Court Alternative, CRIME AND DELINQ., Oct.
1993, at 403 (arguing that abolishing juvenile court and providing youth with full procedural and
substantive safeguards could afford more protection than the juvenile court).
21. See discussion infra part III.
22. See infra part II.A.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
24. Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 466 (1985); see also Study: Black
Teens Face Tough Go In Court, MIAMI HERALD, May 14, 1993, at 2B (stating that Florida, which
tried 6,500 juveniles as adults in 1992, leads the nation in treating young offenders as adults and
Florida prosecutors have the broadest authority in the nation in dealing with young offenders);
Terry Neal, Kid Crimes No Longer Treated with Kid Gloves, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27, 1993, at
IA ("Already, Florida is a leader in prosecuting juveniles as adults-6,300 cases were handled
that way in the last fiscal year. In comparison, Texas, a state of similar size and demographics,
sent 300 last year.").
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education.25 These measures would attempt to reduce juvenile crime by
attacking its sources, rather than throwing children into adult jails which
are incapable of providing rehabilitative services.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Emergence of the National Juvenile Justice System
Ironically, public demands for reform led to the birth of juvenile
courts over one hundred years ago. 26 Prior to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, juveniles were arrested, jailed, tried, and sentenced as adults.27
Conservative reformers felt that exposure to adult offenders increased
juveniles' chances of becoming adult criminals.2" Furthermore, the hor-
rible conditions of adult jails caused judges and juries to acquit
juveniles, rather than sentence them to adult prisons.29
Initial efforts at reform resulted in juveniles being separated from
adults by being placed in reformatories. The first reformatories housed
mainly orphans, children from poor families, homeless children, and
youths picked up for illegal activities.30 Progressive social reformers
sensed these schools' exploitation of their occupants and campaigned for
new child labor and welfare laws, in addition to juvenile courts.31
Finally, in 1899, Illinois adopted the first juvenile court.32 Over the next
twenty years, other states also created juvenile courts. 33 These courts
stressed treatment rather than punishment, and judges were given broad
25. See infra part III.C.
26. Robert M. Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing Perspectives on the Legal
Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, CRIME & DELINQ. 68 (1972).
27. FAUST & BRANTINGHAM, supra note 19, at 2-3.
28. Mennel, supra note 26, at 70.
29. Id.
30. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 16-19. Although the residents were provided with
educational, religious and work training, the House of Refuge commonly set up a factory or
contracted its residents to outside manufacturers to finance their programs. This led to economic
exploitation and oppressive working conditions for the children. H.T. RuBINS, JUVENILE JUSTICE:
POLICY PRACTICE AND LAW 35 (1979). See generally R. PICKETr, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF
JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1815-57 (1969) (describing New York's first House of
Refuge, developed as a special form of discipline for adolescents to convert them into law-abiding
citizens).
31. KRiSBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 24-25. The years 1880-1920 are often referred to
by historians as the Progressive Era, as it was a time of major social change in the United States..
Id. at 27; PLATT, supra note 19, at 101-07.
32. Act of Apr. 21, 1899, 111. Laws 131; KRISBERO & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 1, 61, 76.
33. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 30. Between 1899 and 1904, Colorado, California,
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
passed laws giving juvenile jurisdiction to new or existing courts. By 1909, 20 more states and
the District of Columbia had established juvenile laws, and in 1928 all but two states had a
separate juvenile justice system. See FAUST & BRANTINGHAM, supra note 19, at 15; PLATT, supra
note 19, at 139.
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authority to act in the "best interests of the child" without regard for
procedural safeguards such as lawyers, juries, or rules of evidence.34
Between 1966 and 1973 the legal environment of the juvenile court
changed substantially. 35 Critics began to examine and question major
assumptions underlying the jurisprudence of the criminal court and to
recognize the punitive nature of the juvenile court's actions.36 As it
became clear that the functions of the adult criminal system-apprehen-
sion, prosecution, and punishment, 37-closely resembled those of the
juvenile court, a concern for procedural protections developed. 38  As a
result, in 1966, the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States,39 explaining
that children were getting the "worst of both worlds,' 40 limited the dis-
cretion of the juvenile court judges to enable the transfer of youths to
adult courts to avoid juvenile court sanctions.41 The following year, the
landmark decision of In re Gault2 guaranteed juveniles in delinquency
proceedings a right to counsel, 43 notice of charges, 44 the privilege
against self incrimination,45 and a right to cross-examine witnesses.4 6
This trend, however, suffered a setback in 1971 when the Court held that
a constitutional right to a jury trial does not exist for state juvenile delin-
34. The doctrine of parens patriae substituted state control for parental control under the
rationale that the state would act in the best interests of the child and its intervention would
enhance the child's welfare. See, e.g., KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 17-18; Alexander W.
Pisciotta, Saving the Children: The Promise and Practice of Parens Patriae, 1838-1898, 28
CRIME & DELINO. 410 (1982) (explaining that the doctrine of parens patriae was carried over
from the English common law).
35. DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYs, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS
56 (1991). The Supreme Court did not deal directly with the juvenile justice system until 1966,
however, the Court had previously recognized that many of the factors implicit in the concept of
due process applied to juveniles. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (excluding a murder
confession of 15-year-old boy that was obtained after five hours of interrogation, without the boy
being read his rights, and without the benefit or advice of counsel for violating the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (holding
that a confession, obtained from a 14-year-old boy after he was held five days without counsel and
without being allowed to see his parents, was in violation of the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
36. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 29.
37. See Stephen Wizner, Discretionary Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: An Invitation
to Procedural Arbitrariness, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1984, at 41.
38. KRIS3ERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 29.
39. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
40. Id. at 556.
41. For a discussion of the Kent holding and the impact Kent had on juvenile transfer statutes,
see infra part III.A.
42. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 55.
46. Id. at 56.
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quency proceedings.47 Nonetheless, today, a juvenile is also entitled to a
showing of proof of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.48 More-
over, the rules of double jeopardy49 and speedy trials apply, 50 and the
youth's records are kept confidential and may be expunged when he or
she reaches adulthood.
5 1
B. Emergence of the Florida Juvenile Justice System
In the early 1900s, Florida, following the national trend, began to
separate juvenile offenders from adults by housing juvenile offenders in
reform schools. 2 This, however, was only the first step in recognizing
the differences between the child and the adult offender. Until 1950, the
Florida Constitution vested jurisdiction over all criminal charges against
juveniles in criminal courts. 3 After the constitution was amended to
authorize the legislature to confer criminal jurisdiction over cases
involving juveniles on juvenile courts,54  the Florida Legislature
responded by enacting the Florida Juvenile Justice Act ("the Act"). 5  As
originally enacted, the Act vested jurisdiction over cases involving vio-
lations of law allegedly committed by a child (then a person under sev-
enteen) in juvenile courts or county courts in those counties where no
47. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that right to a jury in
criminal courts' adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement). The Court, however, left
open the option for state legislatures to grant this right to its citizens if it wished. A number of
states today grant juveniles such a right as a matter of state law. Florida, however, is not one of
them. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 35, at 90. Jury trials are granted at a juvenile's request in
Alaska, California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Juveniles are denied the right to a trial by jury
in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. A jury trial is granted by court order
in South Dakota. Id.
48. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1970).
49. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975).
50. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090.
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.045 (1993).
52. Jodi Siegel, Reforming Florida's Juvenile Justice System: A Case Example of Bobby M.
v. Chiles, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 693, 695-96 (1991) The first Florida reform school was called
the Florida State Reform School and was located in Marianna, Florida. It served both girls and
boys but segregated black youth from white youth until 1965. Id.
53. FLA. CONST. art. V. §§ 11, 17, 18, 22, 24, 25, 39 (1885).
54. S. J. Res. 25, Laws of Fla. (1949) (authorizing the legislature to confer on juvenile courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the accused is a minor, and to define
offenses committed by minors as acts of delinquency). For a summary of the reasons for the
enactment of the amendment, see Roger J. Waybright, A Proposed Juvenile Court Act for Florida,
4 U. FLA. L. REv. 16 (1951).
55. Ch. 26880, Laws of Fla. (1951) (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1991)). For a discussion
of the Act when first enacted, see Sue Carter, Chapter 39, The Florida Juvenile Justice Act: From
Juvenile to Adult With the Stroke of a Pen, I1 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 921 (1984).
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juvenile courts existed. 6 Another provision granted discretion to the
juvenile court to transfer felony charges against juveniles fourteen years
of age or older to adult criminal courts, but mandated that a juvenile
sixteen years of age or older, if charged with a capital offense, be trans-
ferred to adult court.57 Since 1951, the legislature has steadily expanded
the transfer of criminal charges from juvenile to adult criminal courts
and has similarly expanded and reiterated its decision that juveniles
charged with capital offenses are to be tried and handled as adults.58
At present, the legislature has vested the juvenile division of the
circuit courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings
"in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or viola-
tion of law."5 9 The court is empowered to "retain jurisdiction, unless
relinquished by its order, until the child reaches nineteen."6 Although
the juvenile court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether a child should be adjudicated delinquent, the Florida Legislature
has determined that some children may not be amenable to juvenile
court treatment.61 Thus, a child who is suspected of committing a delin-
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01-.02 (1951).
57. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1951).
58. In 1955, the legislature amended section 39.02(6) to provide that "any child, irrespective
of age," indicted by a grand jury for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment shall be
tried in criminal court. Ch. 29900, Laws of Fla. (1955) (emphasis added).
In 1969, section 39.02(6)(c) was further revised and the legislative intent clarified by
providing that:
When an indictment is returned by the grand jury charging a child of any age with a
violation of Florida law punishable by death, or punishable by life imprisonment,
the juvenile court shall be without jurisdiction, and the charge shall be made, and
the child shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult:
Ch. 69-146, § 1, Laws of Fla. (1969) (second emphasis added).
In 1973, the legislature substantially rewrote Chapter 39. Exclusive original jurisdiction over
charges against juveniles was returned to the circuit court and provisions were made whereby the
court could try any child 14 years of age or older as an adult on any criminal charge. A child was
also redefined as anyone under 18 years of age. See Ch. 73-231, §§ 2,3 Laws of Fla. (1973). In
1975, Florida incorporated the Kent standards into the Florida Juvenile Justice Act. See FLA.
STAT. § 39.052(2)(c). In 1978, a provision was added allowing a prosecutor to direct-file an
information on a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile "when in his judgment and discretion the public
interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed." Ch. 78-414, § 7, Laws of Fla.
(1978).
In 1981, the legislature further amended section 39.02(5) by providing that'the trial of a
juvenile charged with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment would include prosecu-
tion for any other criminal violations connected with the primary offense. Further, if convicted of
the offense punishable by death or life imprisonment "the child shall be sentenced as an adult."
Ch. 81-269 § 1, Laws of Fla. (1981).
59. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(1) (1993).
60. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(4)(a) (1993).
61. See FLA. STAT. 39.002(5)(a) (1993) regarding legislative intent for serious and habitual
juvenile offenders. The statute notes that "fighting crime effectively requires a multipronged
effort focusing on particular classes of delinquent children and the development of particular
problems".
JUVENILE JUSTICE
quent act or violation of law is subject to one of eight actions by the
state, regardless of any action or lack of action by the intake counselor
or case manager.62 The state attorney may:
(1) File a petition for dependency; (2) File a petition pursuant to Part
IV; (3) File a petition for delinquency; (4) File a petition for delin-
quency with a motion to transfer and certify the child pursuant to ss.
39.022(5) and 39.052(2) for prosecution as an adult; (5) With respect
to any child who at the time of the commission of the alleged offense
was 16 or 17 years of age, file an information when in his judgment
and discretion the public interest requires adult sanctions be consid-
ered or imposed. However, the state attorney shall not file an infor-
mation on a child charged with a misdemeanor, unless the child has
had at least two previous adjudications or adjudications withheld for
delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under
Florida law as a felony; (6) Refer the case to a grand jury; (7) Refer
the case to a diversionary, pretrial intervention, arbitration, or media-
tion program, or to some other treatment or care program if such
program commitment is voluntarily accepted by the child or his par-
ents or legal guardian; or (8) Dismiss the case.63
In addition to action by the prosecutor, a child of any age may
assert his or her right to a jury trial in a criminal, rather than a juvenile
court.' Accordingly, any juvenile charged with unlawful conduct has
initial control over the forum in which he will be tried. This may be
advantageous where juvenile court sanctions are more severe than those
available in the adult court for a similar offense.65 Florida appellate
courts have upheld a juvenile's right to a jury trial on the basis that the
Florida Constitution provides "that the right to a trial by jury shall be
secure to all and remain inviolate. 66 Thus, any "child ... charged with
a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of crime and tried
62. FLA. STAT. § 39.047(4)(e)(1993). Upon ajuvenile's arrest, the child is taken by police to
an HRS screening unit where he or she is processed by an HRS worker (intake counselor). The
intake counselor makes two initial decisions. First, the counselor determines the detention status
of the juvenile. Using a point system to ascertain whether the child can go home or must stay in
detention (delinquency intake), the counselor considers factors such as the severity of the crime,
previous record, and pending charges. No juvenile can be held in detention for longer than 21
days. Second, the intake counselor must decide on his or her recommendation to the state attorney
with respect to judicial handling of the juvenile (file or drop charges, file a motion to waive to
adult court, file a grand jury indictment, direct-file). Barbara Walsh & Trevor Jensen, No Justice,
SUN SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 1993, at 18A.
63. FLA. STAT. § 39.047(4)(e)(1)-(8) (1993).
64. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(b) (1993).
65. For example, a child who receives a traffic citation for a noncriminal offense may be
subject to only a fine in the traffic court, whereas the same offense may subject him to detention or
community control in the juvenile system. See Carter, supra note 55, at 941-43.
66. FLA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 22, see State ex rel. Summer v. Williams, 304 So. 2d 472, 473
(Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
without a jury... shall, upon demand made as provided by law... be
tried in an appropriate court as an adult."67
III. APPLICATION OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW
A. Prosecution of Juvenile Offenders
1. JUDICIAL WAIVER
One type of transfer mechanism that can be used to prosecute
juveniles in adult court is judicial waiver.68 Judicial waiver is the pro-
cess of transferring a juvenile to adult court pursuant to a judicial deci-
sion that the transfer is in the best interests of both the public and the
child.69 Under the judicial waiver mechanism, a child, who was four-
teen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense
for which he or she is charged, is brought before a juvenile court judge
for a due process waiver hearing.70 Based upon considerations such as
67. Id.; see also F.S.N. v. Joyce, 384 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (holding that a
voluntary transfer obtained by a juvenile does not prevent him from receiving future treatment as a
juvenile pursuant to Chapter 39).
68. Judicial waiver is the primary way that juvenile courts make transfer decisions.
CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 35, at 68. Presently, Nebraska, New Mexico, and New York do
not provide for judicial waiver. New York does not because its jurisdictional age is set at 16.
Nebraska does not because its criminal and juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the
more serious offenses. Finally, New Mexico does not provide for judicial waiver because the
New Mexico code for dealing with older, serious offenders provides alternate means. SAMUEL M.
DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 4-1 (Release No. 14, (1994)).
69. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 35, at 68.
70. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2)(c) (1993) provides:
(c) The court shall conduct a hearing on all such motions for the purpose of
determining whether a child should be transferred. In making its determination,
the court shall consider:
I. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community is best served by transferring the child for adult
sanctions.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merits of the report, affidavit, or complaint.
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the child's associates in the alleged crime are adults or children who
are to be tried as adults.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the child,
7. The record and previous history of the child, including:
a. Previous contacts with the department, other law enforcement agencies,
and courts;
b. Prior periods of probation or community control;
c. Prior adjudications that the child committed a delinquent act or violation
of law, greater weight being given if the child has previously been found
by a court to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law
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the child's age, background, and the nature of the charges, the court
must decide whether to continue to treat the juvenile offender as a juve-
nile or to transfer the juvenile to the criminal justice system to be
charged and tried as an adult.7
In Florida, these judicial waiver requirements are consistent with
the Supreme Court's holding in Kent v. United States. 72 In Kent, the
Court held that although a minor has no constitutional right to treatment
in a separate court system, once such a system is authorized by statute, a
juvenile may not be transferred from it until due process requirements
(i.e., a hearing and statement of reasons) are met.73 Characterizing the
waiver process as a "critically important" process that determines signif-
icant statutory rights for the juvenile, the Court held that due process
requires that no transfer to a criminal court shall occur without a hearing
and a statement of reasons.74 In an appendix to the opinion, the Court
announced eight criteria and principles for courts to consider during the
waiver process.75 If, after analyzing the criteria, a court determines that
involving an offense classified as a felony or has twice previously been
found to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law involving an
offense classified as a misdemeanor; and
d. Prior commitments to institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense, by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently
available to the court.
71. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2)(e) (1993).
72. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
73. Id. at 557.
74. Id. at 560-61.
75. Id. at 566-68. These criteria include:
i. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prospective merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults ....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile.., by consideration of his
home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts
with . . . law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior
periods of probation or prior commitments to juvenile institutions;
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available
to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 567.
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adult treatment is appropriate, the child is then bound over for prosecu-
tion, trial and sentencing as an adult criminal defendant. 76
Under Florida law, the prosecutor's decision to request a transfer is
discretionary for juvenile offenders fourteen and older who are either
violent or nonviolent first-time offenders." If a child is currently
charged with a violent crime against a person,78 and is being charged
with a second or subsequent violent crime, however, the prosecutor must
file a motion requesting transfer of the child to adult court. 7 9 Although a
judicial hearing is still required, the initial decision to file in juvenile
court is taken away from the prosecutor because the statute mandates the
filing of a motion to transfer.
A major concern with judicial waiver, as with any kind of transfer
mechanism, is that it does not safeguard the basic premises of the juve-
nile system: treatment and rehabilitation. 0 Because the judge must dif-
ferentiate between those juvenile offenders amenable to rehabilitative
efforts and those whose behavior requires the punitive sanctions of the
criminal justice system, waiver assumes that some youths are beyond
rehabilitation.
Although in a judicial waiver proceeding the judge does not have
absolute discretion in making a decision to transfer under Kent, the con-
flicting criteria presented to the judge under the statute allow for some
discretion.8 ' A judge can selectively emphasize one set of factors over
another to justify any disposition. 2 The Kent factors are said to be
"highly selective; the large number of factors that must be taken into
consideration provide ample opportunity for selection and emphasis in
76. Id. at 566. But see discussion infra, part tII.B. on the sentencing of juvenile offenders.
77. An example of an nonviolent offender would be a car thief or burglar. A violent offender
would be a juvenile charged with a crime such as assault, battery or murder.
78. For example, murder, sexual battery, armed or strong-armed robbery, aggravated battery,
or aggravated assault. See also FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2)(a) (1993) (enumerating previous
delinquent acts sufficient to subject child to statutorily mandated filing of an information in adult
court).
79. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2)(a) (1993).
80. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 70; see also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 976 (1974) (holding that a juvenile institutionalized for crime
has a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding that adults
committed to institutions have a right to rehabilitation because such commitments are not intended
as punishment, and incarceration without treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
81. The criteria are divided into two broad groups: danger to the public, based on the type of
offense committed, and amenability to treatment, based on the individual juvenile's specific
characteristics.
82. Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes
in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 491 (1987).
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discretionary decisions that shape the outcome of individual cases."' 83 It
follows that any time a judge feels that the minor cannot be rehabilitated
or that the adult court would be better suited to handle the child, he can
overemphasize one or more of the factors to justify his decision, or sim-
ply fail to consider them at all. In fact, recent Florida cases indicate that
factors are often weighed differently.
84
Because the judicial waiver criteria require a judge to determine the
juvenile's amenability to treatment, weighing that amenability against
the threat of danger to the public, problems in decision making occur
when the juvenile commits a violent crime and has no past record or
"run-ins" with the law.
a. The Waiver of Francisco Del Rey
An example of how the waiver criteria can be difficult to apply in
certain cases is seen in a recent Florida case involving a fifteen-year-old
juvenile offender, Francisco Del Rey. While drag racing at three o'clock
in the morning, Del Rey's Corvette slammed into another car, killing its
three occupants and paralyzing Del Rey's passenger.8 5 Del Rey was
charged with three counts of manslaughter. After the accident, it was
discovered that Del Rey had been driving illegally for months with a
fake driver's license obtained with the help of his parents.8 6 After con-
sidering several highly publicized media reports on the accident and Del
Rey's family background, the State Attorney filed a motion to transfer
the juvenile to be tried as an adult.8 7 Consistent with Florida Statute
83. Franklin E. Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLIC
POLICY 195 (J. Hall et al. eds., 1981); see also Wizner, supra note 37, at 42 (arguing that
legislation providing for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction invites procedural arbitrariness
because of vague standards and multiple criteria).
84. See Whittington v. State, 543 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Ist DCA 1989) (holding that trial court
erred in permitting juvenile to be prosecuted, tried and sentenced as an adult in absence of court's
compliance with the statutory criteria necessary for judicial waiver regardless of juvenile
indicating at the time of arrest that he was 18 instead of 15); Lurry v. State, 424 So. 2d 868 (Fla.
4th DCA 1982) (juvenile's sentence vacated and remanded to juvenile division for entry of a
transfer order setting forth findings of fact with respect to each of the waiver criteria in the
statute); Mills v. State, 424 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (omission of one of the enumerated
factors requires remand to juvenile division judge for consideration of that item); Gainer v. State,
401 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (certification order transferring juvenile to adult division did
not contain required findings); G.D.W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (juvenile's
sentence vacated and remanded due to trial court's failure to make findings of fact concerning
each of the criteria in the written order); Townsend v. State, 398 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
(court order of transfer waiving juvenile to adult court contained no findings of fact or statement
of reasons for transfer).
85. Sydney P. Freedberg, Judge Reduces Del Rey Charges, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17, 1994, at
lB.
86. Id.
87. Id. Some headlines include: Liz Balmaseda, Del Rey Saga Challenges Our
Preconceptions, MIAmI HERALD, Jan. 19, 1994, at 1B; Sydney P. Freedberg, Teen to be Tried As
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section 39.052, a report by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS") recommended that he be kept in the juvenile division
because "HRS had appropriate means to supervise him. '8 8 A psycholo-
gist testified that Del Rey was "a victim of too much love and not
enough discipline and supervision. '8 9 Furthermore, the psychologist
testified that the legislature, by designing a separate juvenile justice sys-
tem, intended for kids exactly like Del Rey to benefit from it; kids that
were neither violent nor chronic offenders, who lacked guidance and
who could benefit from treatment if given the opportunity. 90 HRS work-
ers interviewing the juvenile also found him amenable to treatment and
rehabilitation based on his low level of maturity, lack of criminal sophis-
tication, and ability to relate well to authority, with no past or present
signs of violent behavior.91
Despite all of the evidence describing his amenability to treatment,
the juvenile court judge felt that Del Rey should be tried as an adult
because the crime was of such an aggressive and willful nature.92 In the
judge's opinion, the offense was given more weight than the juvenile's
individual characteristics. The judge, however, stressed the fact that he
didn't feel Del Rey should be sentenced as an adult.93 He expressed
concern that Del Rey wouldn't survive in an adult prison or even a juve-
nile institution housing predatory, aggressive kids with long records of
violence.94 In assessing the offense, the judge did not appear to blame
the juvenile for driving at three o'clock in the morning in a car bought
and given to him by his parents, but instead queried "What fifteen-year-
old wouldn't drive the car and stay out all night if allowed and
An Adult in Fatal Crash; Judge Rips Parents For Almost Criminal Neglect, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
10, 1994; Sydney P. Freedberg & Manny Garcia, Del Rey Charged in Deaths of 3 Youths He Also
Faces DUI Charges, MiAmi HERALD, Jan. 25, 1994, at IA; Sydney P. Freedberg & Manny Garcia,
Corvette Driver's Age is Questioned Is He 15 or 17? Records Differ, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 6,
1994, at IA; Manny Garcia & Sydney P. Freedberg, In New Del Rey Twist, Dad Charged With
License Fraud, Mimi HERALD, Mar. 25, 1994, at 1 A; Robert L. Steinback, Is it A Crime to Spoil
A Kid Too Much?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 1994; Robert L. Steinback, Thrill of Living Should
Temper Thrill of Speed, MiAmi HERALD, Jan. 7, 1994, at IB; Luisa Yanez, Drag Racer To Be
Tried As An Adult, SuN SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 1994, at 3B.
88. See Freedberg, supra note 85, at 3B.
89. Notes from Del Rey Waiver Hearing in front of Judge Steve Levine on Feb. 18, 1994 at
1:30 p.m. (on file with the author).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Specifically, Judge Levine said "Driving that 'Vette in that fashion resulted in
tragedy, I can't imagine any more serious offense than manslaughter except murder." See also
Freedberg, supra note 85, at IA.
93. Notes from Del Rey Waiver Hearing in front of Judge Steve Levine on Feb. 18, 1994 at
1:30 p.m. (on file with the author).
94. Id.
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encouraged by his parents?" 95 The judge stressed the necessity of letting
the public know that this type of behavior by juveniles would not be
tolerated. Because this was such a highly publicized case, the judge did
not want it to appear that the court was going to be soft on juveniles who
commit crimes with such dire consequences. Thus, the first criterion
under the statute, "[t]he seriousness of the alleged offense to the commu-
nity and whether the protection of the community is best served by
transferring the child for adult sanctions," 96 was interpreted by this par-
ticular juvenile court judge to mean that the public would suffer if the
wrong message is sent to kids regarding the acceptability of this type of
behavior. The judge rejected the interpretation that Del Rey is a violent,
aggressive juvenile who should be locked up because he is a threat to the
community-because this does not appear to be true.97
The judge also seemed to rely on the fact that if Del Rey was sen-
tenced as a juvenile to a juvenile facility and he did not finish his sen-
tence, the judge would have no recourse.98 Juveniles are not placed on
probation like adults, nor do juvenile court judges have contempt power
to sentence juveniles if they fail to complete a program.99 If they fail to
complete their time, they can only be reordered to finish the program. I°
Was this the right decision? Although the judge stated that he did
not feel Del Rey should be sentenced as an adult, once juveniles are
actually tried as adults they are usually labeled as adults and are given
adult sanctions regardless of the statute that mandates the judge to
reconsider similar criteria at sentencing.' 0' Because the sentencing cri-
teria are virtually the same as the waiver criteria, the trial court judge is
likely to come to the same conclusion as the juvenile court judge when
applying similar criteria. 0
Perhaps trying and sentencing Del Rey as an adult will send a
message to the public that the system is getting tough on juveniles and
may temporarily ease the minds of the family and friends of the
deceased and injured victims. Given the nature of Del Rey's offense,
though, he will probably serve about the same amount of time if sen-
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2) (1993).
97. Notes from Del Rey Waiver Hearing in front of Judge Steve Levine on Feb. 18, 1994 at
1:30 p.m. (on file with the author).
98. Id.
99. Folks, supra note 7.
100. Id.
101. In fact, this is what Del Rey's defense attorney argued in his closing argument. See also
infra part III.B. and C. for a discussion of the sentencing of juvenile offenders and problems
associated with it.
102. Although those who feel that the waiver criteria are arbitrary and discretionary would not
necessarily feel this way.
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tenced to an adult prison or a youthful offender facility 03 as he would
have served in a juvenile facility.10 4 If the main reasoning for transfer-
ring juveniles to adult courts is to ensure that they receive longer prison
sentences, this rationale will not stand true, since juvenile court judges
only have jurisdiction over them until they are nineteen years of age.
Rather than receiving treatment and rehabilitation, Del Rey and other
juveniles tried as adults will learn how to behave and think like hardened
criminals as they try to survive their time in prison with violent repeat
offenders.
b. The Waiver of Juvenile "Thomas"10 5
The Del Rey case can be compared with another juvenile case that
received no media attention; the kind of case that is seen by police, pros-
ecutors and judges every day. Mike Thomas, a fifteen-year-old juvenile,
was charged with grand theft of an automobile, reckless driving, leaving
the scene of an accident, fleeing police officers, resisting arrest, driving
without a license, armed robbery, armed burglary with assault, and
aggravated burglary.' 0 6 The state attorney filed a motion to waive the
juvenile into adult court. 107 The juvenile court judge denied the motion,
and, after a trial, imposed juvenile sanctions. 108 The HRS waiver report
indicated that the juvenile had no prior contact with the system, came
from a good family, was doing well in school, and suggested that
Thomas remain in juvenile court.0 9 In fact, the HRS worker recom-
mended community control for Thomas, since she felt he was safe at
home and did not need a residential treatment program." 0 Despite the
recommendation for community control, the judge sentenced Thomas to
a residential commitment program for a couple of months. The judge
did, note, however, that "this is the most serious type of case, other than
a murder case" so community control would not be an appropriate rem-
103. FLA. STAT. § 958 (1993) allows offenders between the ages of 18 and 21 to be sentenced
as Youthful Offenders.
104. FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1992) makes manslaughter a second degree felony. FLA. STAT.
§ 775.082(c) (1992) states that the term of imprisonment shall not exceed 15 years. Since Del
Rey was charged with three counts of manslaughter, if convicted, his time will be served
concurrently for all three counts. The average sentence is usually from 7 to 10 years on a 15 year
maximum term. Thus, Del Rey would end up doing about three to five years, taking into account
the fact that prisoners are currently serving one half or less of their prison sentences.
105. The name of the juvenile in this case has been changed to protect his identity.
106. Information obtained from the juvenile arrest form (on file with the author).
107. Information obtained from the files of the Dade County Public Defender's office, Juvenile
Division (on file with the author).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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edy for this juvenile."'
Since the consequences of the crime in this case were not as severe
as in the Del Rey case, one may argue that Thomas should have been
given a second chance and allowed to receive treatment and counseling
in a juvenile facility; however, this crime, unlike the crime in Del Rey's
case, was clearly intentional. Here the juvenile purposely pointed a gun
at the victims' heads while ordering another juvenile to shoot the vic-
tims, robbed and assaulted the victims, fled in the victims' car and
finally resisted arrest by the police. Is this juvenile less of a threat to
society than a fifteen-year-old drag racer, told and encouraged by his
parents to drive, who had no idea that his actions would harm anyone?
2. PROSECUTORIAL WAIVERS
Though judicial waiver is the most common statutory method for
transferring a juvenile offender into the adult criminal justice system, it
has allowed judges to abuse their discretion, and has proved to be a slow
and somewhat complicated procedure." 12 This has led many legislators
to seek alternate, faster methods to effect such transfers, such as grand
jury indictment or filing an information directly with the circuit court.
a. Indictment by a Grand Jury
Another method for transferring juveniles to adult courts in Florida
is pursuant to an indictment. Under this statutory provision, the state
attorney has the discretion to decide whether to submit the charge to a
grand jury." 3 Once indicted, the child will be treated as an adult for that
offense and for all other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the indict-
ment and based on the same act or transaction as an offense punishable
by life imprisonment or death." 4
111. Id.
112. The procedure is slow, because of the time involved in waiting for a hearing to be set, and
complicated, because it is considered a mini-trial that allows both sides to present witnesses,
conduct cross-examination, and give opening and closing statements.
113. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(c) (1993) provides:
(c)(l) A child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by
death or by life imprisonment is subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set forth in
5.39.049(7) unless and until an indictment on such charge is returned by the grand
jury. When such indictment is returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, shall be
dismissed and the child shall be tried and handled in every respect as if he were an
adult:
a. On the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment; and
b. On all other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the indictment which are
based on the same act or transaction as the offense punishable by death or
by life imprisonment or on one or more acts or transactions connected with
the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment.
114. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(c)(1)(a) (1993). See also Florida ex rel Powers v. Schwartz, 355
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In Johnson v. State"'5 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of section 39.02(5)(c) against a direct attack based on
due process and equal protection grounds.' 16 The juvenile defendant
argued that the statutory provision was defective because it failed to set
guidelines to assist the state attorney or grand jury in determining which
child should be indicted and which should be dealt with as a delin-
quent.II7 Thus, juveniles who commit similar acts could be treated very
differently depending upon the criteria used by the state attorney. For
instance, some juveniles who commit first-degree murder might be
indicted and treated in every respect as though they were adults with the
possibility of facing life in prison, whereas others who commit the same
offense might not be indicted, but would be retained within the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile division to be "rehabilitated.""'  In upholding the
statute, the court found it to be within the scope of legislative authority
under the Florida Constitution which "permits," but does not require that
a child be charged with an act of delinquency instead of a crime." 9 The
court further reasoned that prosecutorial discretion is inherent in our sys-
tem of criminal justice, dating back to the common law of England.'20
This provision is rarely used in Florida since under the statute the
prosecutor can only submit the charge to the jury when the child has
committed a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death. 2' In Flor-
ida this would only apply to armed robberies committed with a fire-
So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ("A circuit court is without authority to treat an indicted
juvenile under the protective provisions of Chapter 39," but must during pretrial proceedings treat
him "as an adult in every respect including the setting of terms for bail or release or
confinement").
115. 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975).
116. This section was renumbered as FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(c) (1991). See Woodard v.
Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding the constitutionality of section 39.02(5)(c);
Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[W~e cannot equate the prosecutorial
decision with judicial proceedings, absent legislative direction."); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d
334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973) (prosecutorial decisions, unlike judicial decisions, have no tradition that a
hearing be given before a decision is rendered).
117. Johnson, 314 So. 2d at 575.
118. Id.
19. Id. at 577; see also FLA. DECL. oF RIGHTs § 15(b) providing: "When authorized by law, a
child as therein defined may be charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of
crime and tried without a jury or other requirement applicable to criminal cases."; Stokes v. Fair,
581 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that there is no inherent or constitutional right to
preferred treatment as a juvenile delinquent).
120. 314 So. 2d at 577. Similarly, federal courts have consistently held that the discretion of
the Attorney General, in deciding whether to prosecute, or whether to abandon a prosecution
already begun, is absolute. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967);
see also Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966),
reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
121. See supra note 113.
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arm, 12 2 attempted first-degree murder, 123 and first-degree murder. 124 It
is also rarely used because sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds can be
direct-filed into adult court.
b. Direct-Filing by Information
An alternate means of transferring a child to the adult criminal
court is pursuant to an information filed directly in adult court by the
state attorney. 121 Unlike judicial waiver, but similar to the indictment
provision, the direct-file provision bypasses the juvenile court system
altogether. The prosecutor is authorized to file an information on a child
who was sixteen or seventeen years of age when the alleged crime was
committed, "when in his judgment and discretion the public interest
requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed." 126 However,
"the state attorney shall not file an information on a child charged with a
misdemeanor, unless the child has had at least two previous adjudica-
tions or adjudications withheld for delinquent acts, one of which
involved an offense classified under Florida law as a felony."'127
In State v. Cain,128 the Florida Supreme Court held that direct-fil-
ings do not require a due process hearing because, like the grand jury
indictment provision, the filing is considered to be at the discretion of
the prosecutor. 129 In Cain, the state charged Mark Cain, a minor, with
two counts of armed burglary and two counts of grand theft.1 30 Cain
filed a motion to dismiss the state's information. He argued that the
statute unconstitutionally delegated to the state attorney unfettered dis-
cretion to prosecute juveniles as adults and that the statute violated due
process by permitting the transfer of the juvenile to adult court without a
hearing. 3 1 The circuit court dismissed the information and the state
122. FLA. STAT. § 812.13(2)(a) (West Supp. 1994).
123. FLA. STAT. § 777.04 (1992).
124. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1992).
125. FLA. STAT. § 39.047(4)(e)(5) (1993). This is often referred to as "direct-filing." See State
v. Everett, 624 So. 2d 853, 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("The state attorney is not precluded from
direct-filing an information despite initially filing a delinquency petition.").
126. FLA. STAT. § 39.047(4)(e)(5) (1993).
127. Id.; see also Lott v. State, 400 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1981) (holding that the requirement that
the juvenile show he has not committed two delinquent acts does not work a hardship on the
juvenile). Under the statute, the juvenile is only required to submit some form of legally sufficient
evidence that he has not committed the subject acts. An affidavit or testimony, for example would
be satisfactory for this purpose. Id.
128. 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980).
129. Id. at 1366. For a thorough discussion of the Cain case, see Tim Day, Prosecutorial
Waiver of Juveniles Into Adult Criminal Court: The Ends of Justice. . . Or The End ofJustice?
State v. Cain, 5 NOVA L.J. 487 (1981).
130. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1362.
131. Id.
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appealed. The court held that a state attorney's decision to file an infor-
mation is no different than the decision to seek an indictment from a
grand jury. 32 "In either case, the legislature has ... returned to the state
attorney his traditional prerogative of deciding who to criminally charge
and with what offense."'' 33 The state attorney is still restricted in that he
may only charge a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old, and an indictment
only ensures that there is probable cause for the charge, not the propriety
of prosecuting a juvenile as an adult. Regarding the due process claim,
the court reasoned that while Kent applied to judicial proceedings, the
court would not equate these prosecutorial decisions with judicial pro-
ceedings absent legislative direction. 134
Recently, in State v. Everett, 35 the Third District Court of Appeals
further expanded prosecutorial discretion regarding the direct-filing pro-
vision. The prosecutor originally filed a delinquency petition against
Everett in the juvenile division.' 36 The prosecutor then filed a motion to
transfer and certify Everett for trial as an adult pursuant to a judicial
waiver hearing. 137 When the juvenile division denied the motion, the
state direct-filed an information against Everett in the criminal divi-
sion. 131 Upon the juvenile's motion to dismiss the information, the court
entered an order transferring the case back to the juvenile division.'3 9
The appellate court held that the prosecutor is not precluded from direct-
filing an information despite initially filing a petition for delinquency. 40
Furthermore, the state may direct-file an information irrespective of the
juvenile court's denial of its motion to certify the juvenile for trial as an
adult. 4' Therefore, even after a judge decides that it is not in society's
best interest to try the child as an adult, the state may disregard this
ruling and direct-file an information.
The main concern with prosecutorial waivers, such as the direct-file
and grand jury indictment provisions, is that the juvenile court will be
bypassed entirely. The initial decision on how to treat an alleged juve-
nile offender will be taken away from the judge, a neutral and detached
132. Id. at 1364.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1366.
135. 624 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 854 (based on Lott v. State, 400 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1981), which held that no written
waiver of transfer ofjurisdiction from juvenile court is required when the state attorney first files a
petition for delinquency and then direct-files an information).
141. 624 So. 2d at 854 (basing its decision on Petithomme v. State, 610 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla.
3d DCA 1992), which held that because the juvenile had not yet been adjudicated, double
jeopardy protections did not bar the state from seeking the indictment).
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arbitrator, and put in the hands of the state attorney, an advocate for the
state and adversary of the juvenile. This makes it unlikely that the
child's best interests will be served. Indeed, state attorneys, like legisla-
tors, may seek transfer of juveniles in response to political pressures or
society's demands for retribution. 142 At the same time, if political safe-
guards need to be in place for judges, according to Kent, which charac-
terized the transfer of a juvenile offender from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court to that of the adult court as "critically important,' ' 43 such
safeguards should also be in place for prosecutors to compensate for
their lack of neutrality. After all, the critical nature of the transfer deci-
sion does not change because it is controlled by the prosecutor rather
than by the court.
Judge Skelly Wright emphasized another argument against these
provisions in United States v. Bland.'" In Bland, the court upheld the
constitutionality of a District of Columbia statute that allows the prose-
cutor to indict a juvenile, sixteen years of age or older, who has commit-
ted one or more of the felonies enumerated in the statute.' 45 In a
compelling dissent, Judge Wright argued that the legislature "overruled"
the Supreme Court's Kent decision by enacting statutes that do not
require a hearing that would be subject to the requirements of due pro-
cess. 14 6 The prosecutor avoids the risk and inconvenience of having to
prove that the juvenile should be tried as an adult when he chooses to
direct-file. This is true today in the filing of an information. The prose-
cutor can easily avoid "the encumbrance of a hearing, the requirement
that he state reasons, the inconvenience of bearing the burden of proof,
[and] the necessity of appointing counsel for the accused" by filing an
information. 47 Over the past ten years, nearly five times more juveniles
142. Day, supra note 129, at 494; see also Mike Folks, More Juveniles Face Adult Charges-
Get-Tough Policy Acts as Crime Deterrent, Palm State Attorney Says, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 1,
1994, at 3B. Palm Beach County State Attorney Barry Krisher started a get-tough juvenile policy
as soon as he took office in 1993. One of his policies requires that juvenile offenders aged 16 and
17, with two or more felony convictions, be charged as adults directly, without resort to a waiver
hearing. This, Krisher states, was done to teach juvenile offenders that selling drugs "is not as
romantic and sexy as it appears on TV and in the movies." Id.
143. 383 U.S. 541, 560 (1966).
144. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
145. Id. at 1338.
146. Id. at 1341.
147. Id. Judge Wright stated:
I think it is obvious that this second procedure was written into the Act in order to
countermand the Supreme Court's decision in Kent . . . Indeed, the House
Committee primarily responsible for drafting the provision virtually admitted as
much. The Committee Report explains 16 D.C. Code § 2301(3)(A) as follows:
Because of the great increase in the number of serious felonies committed by
juveniles and because of the substantial difficulties in transferring juvenile
offenders charged with serious felonies to the jurisdiction of the adult court
1994]
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have been direct-filed into adult court than have been transferred by
judicial waiver.1 48
The prosecutor's unchecked decisionmaking authority is also a
problem. Although decisions regarding judicial waiver are appealable,
exercise of prosecutorial discretion is virtually without administrative or
judicial review.149 In fact, a considerable amount of authority exists for
the proposition that prosecutorial discrimination is itself incident to the
Constitution's separation of powers. Consequently, courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the state
prosecutors. 150 This means, in effect, that speedy decisions made in the
under present law, provisions are made in this subchapter for a better
mechanism for separation of the violent youthful offender and recidivist from
the rest of the juvenile community."
While the surface veneer of legalese which encrusts this explanation need fool no
one, a simultaneous translation into ordinary English might, perhaps, prove helpful.
The substantial difficulties . . under present law to which the committee coyly
refers are, of course, none other than the constitutional rights explicated in the Kent
decision.
Id.
148. In Dade County in 1993, 24 juveniles were judicially waived into adult court and 750
were direct-filed. Juvenile Division of the Dade County Clerk (on file with the author).
The following represent the number of direct-files and judicial waivers over the past ten
years:
Direct Files Waiver Hearings
Dade Statewide Dade Statewide
1982 895 3,186 131 451
1983 490 2,701 80 366
1984 241 1,929 54 280
1985 173 2,339 27 276
1986 235 2,767 28 376
1987 513 3,505 48 490
1988 488 4,223 100 379
1989 584 4,974 63 531
1990 782 5,226 82 486
1991 679 5,562 62 398
1992 643 5,495 21 533
Data obtained from the Office of the State Court Administrator (on file with the author).
149. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 35, at 72; see also Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d
781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]reatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but granted by the
state legislature, therefore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as
no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved.").
150. State v. Bauman, 425 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). See also Woodard v.
Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977); Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973);
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hausberg,
381 U.S. 935 (1965). Certain courts have also held that where the prosecutor can determine the
forum, the court should give traditionally wide latitude to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
See Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss. 1975); State v. Lytle, 231 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Neb.
1975); Myers v. District Court, 518 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1974); State v. Grayer, 215 N.W.2d 859, 860
(Neb. 1974).
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prosecutor's office without uniform standards can result in conscious
abuse or negligent misapplication of the statutes, and thus, in arbitrary
decision making that goes unchecked and unreviewed. 151
3. LEGISLATIVE WAIVER
In addition to judicial and prosecutorial waiver provisions, many
states have legislative or automatic transfer provisions.' 52 Although the
prosecutor's decision as to the offense charged decides the forum, under
such waiver provisions, it is the legislature that has made the policy
choice. 153 In both instances, however, the prosecutor controls the
waiver decision either directly, by picking the court, or indirectly,
through his decision to charge a specified offense.154 Not all states have
these provisions, so they are not as common as judicial and prosecutorial
waiver provisions.15 5 They are, however, gaining popularity in response
to public demands for harsher sanctions for juvenile offenders.
One legislative waiver strategy is to lower the age at which a crimi-
nal court has jurisdiction. 156 Another, more common, strategy is for the
legislature to specify those offenses for which a juvenile may not be
adjudicated in juvenile court. 157 Under this type of provision, the legis-
lature provides that if a juvenile has committed certain types of offenses
(usually rape, homicide, or robbery), has been charged with a certain
number of felonies, or has a certain number of previous delinquency
adjudications, the juvenile court will lose jurisdiction and the juvenile
will be tried as an adult.'5 8
These types of statutes are inconsistent with the rehabilitative phi-
losophy of the juvenile court for a number of reasons. First, they focus
151. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Juvenile Delinquent or Adult Convict-The Prosecutors Choice, 14
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 36-37 (1976); see also Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 24, at 478 (noting
that while most of the powers vested in the judiciary are exercised in open court, prosecutorial
decisions are exercised behind closed doors, and thus make enforcement of any regulations
virtually impossible).
152. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (Supp. 1994) (excluding those at least 14 years of age
who allegedly commit murder, robbery, rape, or murder from juvenile court jurisdiction); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987) (excluding those over 12 years of age charged with
murder and those over 13 years of age charged with such crimes as kidnapping, arson, and rape
from juvenile court jurisdiction).
153. Feld, supra note 82, at 514-15.
154. Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 44.
155. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia exclude certain offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction. CHAMPION & MAYs, supra note 35, at 71.
156. In New York, for example, the jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court is set at the
age of 16. This is the youngest jurisdictional age in any state. N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT,
§ 301.2(1) (McKinney 1983).
157. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 35, at 73.
158. Id.
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on the offense rather than the individual juvenile's characteristics' 5 9 and
his or her ability to be rehabilitated, presuming instead that children who
commit certain crimes are incapable of being rehabilitated through the
juvenile process. 6 ° Thus, the court is denied the opportunity to get
juveniles the help they may need. Second, since the statutes are usually
the result of legislators responding to the public's demand for more
punitive measures for juveniles to deter them from committing
crimes, 16 they are more public safety measures than long-term solutions
to juvenile crime.' 62 "Get-tough" waiver legislation seldom addresses
the possible consequences for youths incarcerated in adult correctional
facilities, the quality or effectiveness of the programs available to
youths, or the effects of juvenile versus adult dispositions on recidi-
vism. 163 For example, California tried, in 1994, to pass new legislation
to lower the age at which a juvenile could be tried for murder in adult
court from sixteen to fourteen, 6 even though the average length of stay
in adult prison in 1994 was 16.2 months, whereas in juvenile prisons, it
was 26.1 months. 65 Because adults were often released before serving
their maximum time and juveniles were not, juveniles served fifty per-
cent longer sentences for the same homicide convictions than did their
adult counterparts. 166 At the same time, California's juvenile recidivist
rate was seventy percent and rising, and fifty percent of the state's
imprisoned juveniles have been arrested more than six times. 67 Simi-
larly, in Idaho, a recent study on the deterrent effects of a waiver statute
indicated that since the law's enactment in 1981, serious juvenile crime
has not been reduced.' 6 Furthermore, juvenile offenders usually return
159. Feld, supra note 82, at 515.
160. Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 37.
161. Feld, supra note 82, at 519. Although, many argue that in reality, the children who really
need to get the message rarely do. See Dowie, When Kids Commit Adult Crimes, Some Say They
Should Do Adult Time, CAL. LAWYER, Oct. 1993, at 58 (quoting Barry Krisberg: "[C]an you
imagine a bunch of 14 and 15 year old kids sitting around the 'hood saying, 'Gee, did you read
that the Assembly just lowered the minimum adult-trial age to 14?'. The whole point of separate
systems is that children are not small adults. When we lose touch with that, we lose touch with
our whole legal system.").
162. Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 37.
163. Feld, supra note 82, at 519.
164. Cal. Assembly Bill 136 (SN), Regular Sess. (1993) (introduced by Charles Quackenbush);
see also Dowie, supra note 161, at 56.
165. Dowie, supra note 161, at 58. But see infra part III.B. (concluding that generally kids
tried in adult court actually receive lower sentences than their adult counterparts).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver
on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELrNQ. 96, 101-02 (1994). The study compared the
years 1976-1980 with 1982-1986. Idaho revised its legislative waiver statute in 1981. This law
mandated the automatic waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction for youths 14 to 18 years of age who
were accused of any degree of attempted murder, robbery, forcible rape, mayhem, assault and
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from the adult process with little change in their attitudes toward the
society that placed them there. 169
Besides being inconsistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the
juvenile court, these statutes often appear to be responding to the pub-
lic's get-tough attitude without actually having any new effect. This
kind of legislation has recently started to appear in Florida. Recent
media reports on the state of crime in Florida have engendered public
outcry and a get-tough attitude toward juvenile offenders. 70 In
response, the Florida Legislature convened a special session in Novem-
ber 1993, to consider ways to attack juvenile crime. 17 1 A bill introduced
by Representative Martinez, and signed into law on November 24, 1993
by Governor Chiles, 172 made major changes to Chapter 790,173 which
governs the regulation of weapons and firearms. The bill provides,
among other things, 174 that a child fourteen or older at the time of the
commission of a fourth or subsequent alleged felony offense, where one
battery with intent to commit any of the above specified crimes. Id. at 98; see IDAHO CODE § 16-
1806A (1994).
169. See, e.g., Teenage 'Adult' in Prison Shows System's Failure, MIAMI HERALD, May 17,
1993, at IB (quoting Florida's youngest inmate Eddie McGee, age 14: "They think prison is
going to change you man. They just don't know how this is, man. I only learn how to do more
better crimes. How to make more money. How to sell more dope. That's all people talk about
... When you stay in here long, that's what makes your mind more devious.").
170. See, e.g., Ron Allen, 2 Teen-agers Sought In Shoot-Out, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 1994, at
2B; Student is Accused of Poisoning Teacher, Boy, 14, Charged With Attempted Murder, SUN
SENTINEL, Feb. 17, 1994, at 18A; Larry Barszewski, Florida Lacks Programs for Youngest
Criminals, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 1994, at IB; Battinto Batts, Jr., Student Accused of Stabbing
Involved in Previous Assault, SuN SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 1994, at I B; Aileen Dodd, Teen Crime a
Hot Topic, SuN SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 1993, at 9B; Florida Ranked Among Worst In Crime, Justice,
SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 1, 1994 at 7A; Linda Kleindienst, Republican Candidates Blast Chiles, State
Programs, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 1993, at 7A; Linda Kleindienst & Diane Hirth, Youth Violence
on Rise-Kids Joke About Justice System, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 17, 1993, at 1A; Linda Kleindienst
& Peter Mitchell, Legislators Get Tough on Crime, Dodge New Taxes, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 24,
1994, at IA; Stephanie Smith, Three Girls to Stand Trial as Adults in Murder, SUN SENTINEL, Jan.
27, 1994, at IA.
171. Donna 0' Neal, Bill Takes Aim at Weapons for Kids; The Legislature Could Enact New
Restrictions on Youths' Access to Firearms and BB Guns This Week as Part of its Anti-Crime
Drive, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 1993, at B6.
172. FLA. H.B. 91, Sp. Sess. of Nov. 1 to Nov. 11, 1993.
173. FLA. STAT. ch. 790 (1993).
174. Further, this bill provides that: a law enforcement agency will be able to release the name
and address of a minor child who has been convicted of an offense involving possession of a
firearm; possession of a firearm by a minor will be a first-degree misdemeanor; a minor charged
with an offense that involves the possession of a firearm will be required to perform 100 hours of
community service and will have his driver's license revoked or withheld for up to one year; and a
minor charged with an offense that involves use of a firearm shall be automatically detained in
secure detention and shall be given a hearing by the judge to decide whether to keep the minor in
detention until trial. If the judge finds that the minor is a clear and present danger to the
community or himself, the juvenile may continue to be held in detention for the maximum time
allowed under chapter 39. FLA. H.B. 91 §§ 1, 5(5)(a), 5(5)(a)(1), 5(8), Sp. Sess. of Nov. I to Nov.
11, 1993.
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of the past felonies involved the use or possession of a firearm, will be
tried as an adult unless the state attorney gives written reasons for not
doing so.'75 This law is unnecessary. Florida law already permits a six-
teen- or seventeen-year-old to be direct-filed into adult court upon the
discretion of the prosecutor. Moreover, a prosecutor can also move for a
waiver into adult court of a juvenile above the age of fourteen where
trial as an adult would be in the best interest of the child or society.17 6
Thus, juveniles who are on their fourth felony are usually tried as adults,
as long as they are at least fourteen years old. By mandating that the
state attorney file a motion to transfer, upon receipt of which motion the
judge must issue the order, the legislature has only succeeded in taking
the waiver decision away from the judge.
The 1994 Regular Session also witnessed the introduction of
numerous bills aimed at taking discretion away from both juvenile court
judges and prosecutors.' 77 These bills ranged from authorizing the state
attorney to file informations contemplating adult sanctions against cer-
tain juveniles based on the type or number of crimes committed by that
juvenile in the past,'78 to lowering the age for juvenile court jurisdic-
tion'79 and finally to authorizing law enforcement agencies to release the
names of juveniles taken into custody for felonies and misdemeanors. 80
These measures are clearly the legislature's response to the public's
175. FLA. H.B. 91 § 8, Sp. Sess. of Nov. I to Nov. 11, 1993.
176. See supra part III.AI, IlI.A2(b).
177. Diane Hirth, Juvenile Justice Legislation Favors Tough Punishment, SUN SENTINEL, Mar.
8, 1994, at I 1A; Tim Nickens, Reform Bill: 3 Felonies Turn Youths to Adults, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 24, 1994, at 8B; Diane Hirth, Session to Focus on Crime Legislators to Hear Cures For
Violence, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 6, 1994, at IA.
178. FLA. S.B. 2280, 1994 2d Reg. Sess. (requiring that a suspected child felon of any age be
transferred for prosecution as an adult if he or she has been adjudicated delinquent for two or more
separate prior offenses that would be felonies if committed by an adult); FLA. S.B. 1902, 1994 2d
Reg. Sess. (authorizing the state attorney to file an information against a juvenile with previous
felony adjudications if his or her current offense is classified under state law as capital felony or a
life felony); FLA. H.B. 2099, 1994 2d Reg. Sess. (authorizing the state attorney to file an
information on a child, regardless of age, who has previously been found to have committed six or
more felonies); FLA. H.B. 1571, 1994 2d Reg. Sess. (authorizing the state attorney to file an
information on a 14- or 15-year-old if charged with arson, sexual battery, robbery, kidnapping,
aggravated child abuse, aggravated assault, murder, manslaughter, unlawful throwing or
discharging of a bomb, armed burglary, aggravated battery, lewd or lascivious assault or act in the
presence of a child, or carrying or using a firearm during a felony).
179. FLA. S.B. 1306, 1994 2d Reg. Sess. (changing the age at which a child may be charged as
an adult from 14 to 12; lowering the maximum age at which a person is considered a child for
purposes of juvenile delinquency proceedings from 18 to 14). FLA. S.B. 266, 1994 2d Reg. Sess.
(changing the maximum age for juvenile classification for delinquency proceedings to 16 years of
age; changing court jurisdiction to 17 years of age for delinquent acts and 19 years of age for
serious or habitual offenders).
180. FLA. H.B. 1737, 1994 2d Reg. Sess. (authorizing law enforcement agencies to release the
names of juveniles taken into custody for offenses that would be felonies or misdemeanors if
committed by adults).
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growing fear of juvenile crime, and the media's overexaggeration of
it. 181
The political need to do "something," even if that something has
not been successful in the past, is on the minds of legislators who are
facing reelection. However, these recent bills are not only unnecessary,
but they are also ineffective at deterring juvenile crime. Juveniles have
been waived, direct-filed, and indicted into adult criminal court for many
years, 82 yet the crime rate has not decreased. In fact it has increased.1 83
These get-tough measures are based on the notion that the risk of being
prosecuted as an adult will deter juveniles from engaging in criminal
acts.' 84 There is, however, no evidence that this premise is valid.
Indeed, a recent study by the Center for the Study of Youth Policy con-
cluded: "At present, we possess no compelling evidence that either
enhanced prosecution or stiffer penalties can prevent or control violent
and serious youth crime." 185
In addition, kids tried in adult court generally receive lower
sentences than adults.' 86 A nationwide study of children sentenced as
adults found that the majority of these children were either fined or
placed on probation. 8 7 "In Florida, around one-half of the children
waived into adult court in 1990-1992 received probation."' 8 8 Many rea-
sons have been set forth to explain why this occurs: A jury may be more
likely than a judge to acquit a juvenile, a minor released on bail rather
than held in pretrial detention is less likely to plead guilty and age often
counts as a mitigating factor.' 89 Juveniles actually sentenced as adults
only spend about two years or less in prison because of Florida's over-
crowded prison system. 90 In most cases this is less time then they
181. See FLA. H.B. 91, Sp. Sess. of Nov. I to Nov. 11, 1993, regarding legislative intent:
Whereas the love affair between juveniles and firearms has reached an all-time high
here in Florida, and.., it is the will of the legislature and all Floridians that parental
involvement, accountability, and responsibility become the key to solving our
existing broken juvenile criminal justice system, and... it is the will of Floridians
all across this great state of ours that juveniles who violate laws pertaining to the
illegal use of firearms be dealt with in a swift and certain and severe manner ....
182. See supra part II.B.
183. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Diane Hirth, Juvenile Bills Draw Warnings Judges: Adult Prisons Won't Help
Youngsters, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 1994, at IA; Linda Kleindienst & Ardy Friedberg,
Department For Juvenile Crime Ok'd, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1994, at IA.
185. Laura Murphy Lee, No: Avoid Simplistic Solutions, A.B.A. J. Mar. 1994, at 47.
186. A.B.A. Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and their
Families, America 's Children At Risk, July 1993, at 65 [hereinafter A.B.A. Working Group].
187. Feld, supra note 82, at 501.
188. A.B.A. Working Group, supra note 186, at 65.
189. Jan Costello, Rejuvenation. How to Reform Juvenile Court, CAL. LAWYER, Oct. 1993, at
65.
190. Hirth, supra note 177.
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would spend in a juvenile facility where they could be getting treatment
and counseling. 191 Although these get-tough measures allow juveniles
to be "tried" as adults, there is no guarantee that they will be sentenced
as adults. However, the 1994 Legislative Session did not introduce any
bills to address this issue.
B. Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders
After a juvenile has been tried and convicted as an adult, with the
exception of a juvenile found to have committed an offense punishable
by death or life imprisonment, 192 the court may still impose juvenile
sanctions.1 93 The suitability of adult sanctions is determined by the
court at a hearing after reviewing a predisposition report prepared by the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"),'94 and by
looking at six enumerated criteria in the statute.1 95 The criteria include
the seriousness of the offense to the community and whether the child
should be sentenced as an adult to protect the community, whether the
offense was committed in a violent manner, whether the offense was
against persons or property, the maturity of the child, any past criminal
record, the prospects for adequate protection of the public, and the likeli-
hood of reasonable rehabilitation if the child is assigned to the services
191. Because juvenile court has jurisdiction over the juvenile only until he is 19 years of age,
17-year-olds can receive a maximum of 2 years, 16-year-olds a maximum of 3 years, and 15-year-
olds a maximum of 4 years. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(4)(a). The exception to this is that the juvenile
court may retain jurisdiction over a serious or habitual offender until the age of 21. FLA. STAT.
§ 39.022(4)(b).
192. See Duke v. State, 541 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a child of any age who is
convicted of a life felony, defined as an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, should
be sentenced as an adult pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c)(3)). Under the current statute, the
trial and sentencing requirements of 39.059(7) apply to waivers and direct-filing cases. See FLA.
STAT. § 39.022(5), 39.052(2).
193. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(1) (1993) provides:
(1) A child who is found to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law
may, as an alternative to other dispositions, be committed to the department for
treatment in an appropriate program for children outside the adult correctional
system, be placed in a community control program, be classified as a youthful
offender, or be classified as a serious or habitual juvenile offender pursuant to
39.058.
See also Duke v. State, 541 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a convicted juvenile felon is not
subject to youthful offender status and not subject to the enumerated sentencing criteria). By
statute, a youthful offender may be placed on probation or incarcerated in a county facility, a
department probation and restitution center, or a community residential facility. The court also
has the option of imposing a split sentence, whereby the youthful offender is incarcerated and then
placed on probation. Finally, the court may commit the offender to the department. FLA. STAT.
§ 958.04(b)-(d).
194. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a) (1993).
195. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(c) (1993).
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for delinquent children. 96 Under the Act, any decision to impose adult
sanctions must be in writing and the court must render specific findings
of fact and enumerate the reasons for the decision after evaluating each
of the above criteria.' 97 On their face, the criteria appear to grant broad
dispositional alternatives to judges dealing with juvenile defendants,
however, there remain a number of concerns regarding this statute.
First, trial courts have failed to properly employ the six-part test.' 98
Although the Florida courts of appeal have overturned these improper
decisions, the trial courts' reluctance to follow the criteria, either
through defiance or ignorance, stresses the same problem as is seen with
the waiver criteria: Trial judges can, and do, arbitrarily give more
weight to one factor than others if they favor treating juveniles as adults.
The juveniles' only recourse is the appellate courts. In 1993, the
Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases which may eliminate the
trial courts' inconsistency in applying the sentencing criteria.
In Troutman v. State,199 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
question of whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory
criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d) when sentencing a
juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings must be
contemporaneously reduced to writing. 00 The court had to resolve the
conflict between the First District Court of Appeals previous decision in
Troutman2 0 and those appellate courts which were following Rhoden v.
State.202 Troutman, a sixteen-year-old, was charged with kidnapping to
facilitate a felony, grand theft of a car, and aggravated assault with a
196. Id. These criteria are almost exactly like the criteria required under Kent for judicial
waiver. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1965).
197. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1993).
198. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 547 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (holding that there must be
some written indication, either in the form of a sentencing order or a transcript, that the court
considered each of the six criteria); Murphy v. State, 546 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
(holding that a judge cannot make notations on a checklist in order to comply with Sec. 39.111;
specific written findings of fact and reasons for the decision must be made and signed by the
court); Ervin v. State, 561 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that failure to write an opinion
or specify actual findings of fact is reversible error); Youngblood v. State, 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla.
5th DCA 1990) (holding that the court must consider all six factors and must track them using
nonconclusory language and must provide specific findings of fact and reasons for each);
Trueblood v. State 610 So. 2d 14, 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding that the trial court's oral
statement that the juvenile continued to break the law because he had not been properly punished
in the past, and that "he didn't know what else to do" but to impose adult sanctions, does not
amount to specific findings of fact).
199. 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993).
200. Id.
201. 603 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (upholding the trial court's decision that the
criteria were sufficiently considered when the written order and sentencing transcript were read
together).
202. 448 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (Fla. 1984) (holding that Sec. 39.11 ](6)(d) requires that a decision
to impose adult sanctions must specifically consider all statutory criteria and must be in writing),
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deadly weapon.2 3  Troutman was direct-filed into adult court and
pleaded no contest to false imprisonment and grand theft.2"4 Although
the predisposition report recommended that Troutman be sentenced as a
juvenile and placed on community control, and although he had no prior
record, the trial judge concluded that juvenile sanctions were inade-
quate.20 5 In his written order, the trial judge only briefly addressed the
six sentencing criteria with reference to the factual content of the
case.20 6 On appeal, after looking at the sentencing transcript and the
written order filed three days later, the court found compliance with the
six criteria of section 39.059.207
Relying on the Rhoden decision, which recognized a juvenile's
right to be treated differently from an adult under the juvenile justice
statutory scheme,208 the supreme court held that the trial court must give
an individualized determination of how a particular juvenile fits within
the criteria, and furthermore, that any decision to impose adult sanctions
must be in writing.20 9 In deciding that each criterion must be indepen-
dently considered, the court noted that the statutory language of section
39.059 mandates adherence to the criteria.210 In a footnote to the opin-
ion, Justice Barkett noted that strict adherence is especially important in
followed in, e.g., Flowers v. State, 546 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Bell v. State, 598 So. 2d
203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Myers v. State, 593 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
203. 630 So. 2d 528, 528-30.
204. Id.
205. Id. The trial judge stated: "[Troutman] has no prior record, but I think this is a very
serious case.... I'm concerned about the ability of Juvenile sanctions in this case to impress upon
Mr. Troutman the results of this type of action. So I am going to sentence him as an adult." Id. at
530 n.3.
206. In addressing the criteria, the trial judge wrote:
The court imposed adult sanctions in lieu of juvenile sanctions in this case for the
following reasons:
1. The primary charge in this case, false imprisonment, was committed in a
premeditated and willful manner and was extremely serious, given that the
Defendant perpetrated the false imprisonment with the use of a scissors, which
could be considered a deadly weapon. The Defendant is just shy of his
seventeenth birthday; however, he demonstrates a certain street sophistication
beyond his chronological age.
2. The Defendant has only one prior contact with the juvenile authorities, which
was not a serious offense.
3. The period of time available to impose juvenile sanctions is insufficient to
adequately protect the community and to afford the Defendant sufficient
counseling to ensure his rehabilitation.
4. The imposition of juvenile sanctions are insufficient to impress upon the
Defendant the seriousness of this type of action.
Id. at 530 n.4.
207. 603 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
208. 448 So. 2d 1013, 1017.
209. 630 So. 2d 528, 531 (Fla. 1993).
210. Id.
JUVENILE JUSTICE
cases like Troutman's where the defendant is direct-filed into adult
court, because it is "the only formal means of ensuring that the juvenile
is being properly treated as an adult. 2
11
The court explained its decision requiring a written decision by
comparing the criteria for juvenile sentencing with two other sentencing
schemes where statutes require written findings-findings in support of
a death sentence and the reasons for departing from sentencing guide-
lines.212 The court noted that anytime trial judges treat individuals more
harshly than is customary, statutory safeguards need to be strictly main-
tained.2 13 Because the written findings in Troutman's case were issued
three days after sentencing, they were held to be untimely and therefore
inadequate.214 The court said, however, that even if they had been
timely, the findings would still have been inadequate because they were
merely conclusory.215
It is evident from this opinion-and others which simply reverse on
the absolute failure to comply with the law 2 16-that section 39.059(7)
requires the trial court to review all six of the subsections, make factual
findings with regard to each, and then set forth in writing the reasons for
the decision to impose adult sanctions.21 7
Troutman leaves unclear just what would make the trial court's
decision to impose adult sanctions not "conclusory." In his dissent, Jus-
tice Overton disagreed with the court's finding that the transcript of the
sentencing hearing and the written order did not, together, meet the
requirements of section 39.059.218 He said that the majority's strict con-
struction of the statute would "only increase problems in the operation
of an already overburdened juvenile justice system. ' 21 9 On the other
hand, strict construction of a statute is necessary to ensure that the juve-
nile receives some kind of analysis as a juvenile, especially in instances
211. Id. at 531 n.5.
212. Id. at 532.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra note 198.
217. Since Troutman, several district courts have reversed trial courts sentencing of juveniles
as adults based on its holding. E.g., State v. Veach, 630 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1994) ("On authority of
Sirmons and Troutman we approve the First District's decision in Veach."); Dennis v. Florida, 630
So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that "Dennis was sentenced without the protections of
Troutman"); Glidewell v. State, 630 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (reversing due to the trial
court's failure to make written findings as required by Sec. 39.059(7) and Troutman); Skipper v.
State, 630 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding that trial court committed reversible error by
sentencing the juvenile as an adult without meeting the requirements of 39.059(7), state conceding
error based upon Troutman).
218. 630 So. 2d 528, 533 (Fla. 1993).
219. Id.
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like Troutman, where there is no judicial waiver hearing, only a direct-
file.220 Failure by the trial court to consider the statutory criteria before
sentencing a juvenile ignores the rehabilitative function of the juvenile
justice system and abrogates the juvenile's right to be treated differently
from an adult. An overburdened court system should not be the reason
that a juvenile is denied the protection he or she is entitled to by statute.
A second concern with the sentencing of juvenile offenders is
whether application of these criteria can ever be waived by the juvenile.
In Sirmons v. State,22' the court reviewed whether a juvenile who enters
into a negotiated plea agreement that allows the court to consider the
imposition of either adult or juvenile sanctions, necessarily waives the
requirement that the court consider the six criteria for sentencing as an
adult under section 39.059(7).222 Initially, the state filed a delinquency
petition against Sirmons, a fifteen-year-old, alleging he had committed
robbery with a firearm and discharged a firearm into an occupied build-
ing.223 Later, the state moved to waive juvenile court jurisdiction over
Sirmons and to transfer him for trial as an adult.224 After a waiver hear-
ing, he was transferred to adult court. Subsequently, Sirmons entered a
plea of nolo contendre to the charges in exchange for a maximum prison
sentence of nine years with a three year minimum mandatory sentence if
he was sentenced as an adult.225  After the judge considered the
presentence and predisposition report, he sentenced Sirmons. The court
did not express in writing its specific findings of fact and its reasons for
the decision to impose adult sanctions.226 On appeal, Sirmons' sentence
was affirmed based on Davis v. State.227 In Davis, the Second District
Court of Appeal had held that a negotiated plea agreement "obviated the
need for the court to make the written findings and reasons for imposing
adult sanctions on a juvenile defendant. ' 228 The court, however, recog-
nized a conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Lang v.
State.229 Lang held that a juvenile entering into a negotiated plea agree-
220. See supra part III.A.2(b) regarding direct-files.
221. 620 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1993).
222. Id. at 1250.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1251.
227. 528 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1988).
228. Id. at 522.
229. 566 So. 2d 1354, 1357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Other District Courts of Appeal were also in
conflict. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 596 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Ist DCA 1992) (holding that a waiver of
right to juvenile sentence must be knowing, intelligent and manifested in the record); Toussaint v.
State, 592 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that negotiated plea is not a waiver of the
right to a juvenile sentence, and that requirement of specific findings by trial court applies to
juvenile tried by direct information as well as transfer from juvenile division); McCray v. State,
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ment may waive the right to have the court to make the required specific
findings before imposing adult sanctions, as long as a waiver is apparent
either in the plea agreement or on the record.23 ° In addressing the state's
argument that Sirmons' plea was a waiver of his juvenile rights, since
the validity of the plea recognized Sirmons' knowledge that the plea
included the possibility the court may impose adult sanctions, the
supreme court relied on its decision in Rhoden.23 1  Because juveniles
have "a right to be treated differently from adults," they have a right to
have the court evaluate the criteria listed in 39.059.232 The Florida
Supreme Court held that since the legislature has mandated the court to
provide factual findings and reasons in a written order, this must apply
in all situations.233 The supreme court did say, however, that a juvenile
can negotiate a plea waiving this right under the proper circumstances.
Those circumstances include the trial judge informing the juvenile of the
rights provided by the legislature under section 39.059, and the judge
ensuring that the juvenile is "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
waiving those rights. '234 Applying this rule to the facts in Sirmons, the
court found that the record did not reflect that Sirmons gave a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his rights.235 Given the mandatory language of
the statute, however, it is doubtful that consideration of these criteria can
ever be waived, despite the juvenile's intent.236
Once an appellate court finds that a trial court did not adequately
follow the criteria, the case typically is remanded for proceedings in
588 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (holding that waiver or right to be sentenced as juvenile must
be knowing and intelligent and the right is not waived where the defense counsel suggests the
juvenile be sentenced as an adult); Sullivan v. State, 587 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding
that written findings of fact and reasons for imposing adult sentences are not waived by a
juvenile's no contest plea and thus, are still required to sustain the adults sentence); Tighe v. State
571 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that a transcript which is part of the record might
satisfy the statute if it contained findings of fact and reasons for the decision, as opposed to being
part of the written record); Taylor v. State, 534 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding that it is
possible to waive the statutory criteria, however, they were not waived in this case).
230. While the appeal was pending to the Florida Supreme Court, the Second District Court of
Appeal receded from its holding in Davis. In Croskey v. State, 601 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 2d DCA
1992) (en banc), the court held it reversible error for a court to sentence a juvenile as an adult
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement without making the statutorily required findings under
§ 39.059(7)(c) or finding that the juvenile voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those
rights.
231. 620 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1993).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Justice Barkett's concurrence which provides: "It is the intent of the legislature that
the foregoing criteria and guidelines shall be deemed mandatory... [t]hus I question whether the
mandatory findings required in the statute can ever be waived by a juvenile, notwithstanding a
juvenile's attempt to do so." Id. at 1252 (emphasis in opinion).
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accordance with the appellate court's opinion.237 Some judges have
suggested, however, that the appellate court remand to the trial court
with instructions to impose juvenile sanctions. For example, in Tighe v.
State,238 Judge Dauksch suggested applying the rule in Pope v. State
239
to juvenile sentencing remands.24° In Pope, the court held that when an
appellate court reverses for departing from sentencing guidelines
because there were no written reasons presented, the court must remand
for resentencing with no possibility of departure from the guidelines.24'
This was a result of the court's concern that, on remand, lower court
judges would search for reasons to justify a departure sentence. Thus,
the Tighe court did not want sentencing judges to search for "new" rea-
sons to sentence a juvenile as an adult.242 Judge Daukstch indicated that
"in a remand to the trial court with instructions to impose juvenile sanc-
tions.. . the same potential problems mentioned in Pope could arise in
situations like this case. 243 In Troutman, however, Justice Barkett dis-
tinguished Pope by stating that, in sentencing juveniles as adults, trial
judges are limited to evaluating specific criteria whereas, in cases like
Pope, trial judges could legitimately search for "new reasons. '244 Jus-
tice Barkett's distinction is valid, however, only insofar as judges whose
decisions have been reversed adhere to the specific procedures set forth
in the statute. Given their reluctance to do so in the first instance, it may
not be fruitful to count on their compliance on remand.
The sentencing criteria reflect the legislature's recognition that
prosecutorial discretion, and perhaps even judicial discretion, may be
abused in some cases, and may result in dire consequences. Yet, the
most scrupulous adherence to the juvenile sentencing structure may have
consequences just as dire, as long as the programs and facilities designed
to receive these young offenders remain inadequate or insufficient in
number.
C. Facilities and Programs for Juvenile Offenders
Before one can solve the problems of trying and sentencing juve-
nile offenders, one must understand what actually happens to juveniles
once they are disposed of either as "delinquents" in the juvenile justice
system or as "convicts" in the adult system. One of the main reasons
237. See supra notes 198, 217 regarding cases that have been so disposed.
238. 571 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
239. 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990).
240. 571 So. 2d 83, 84.
241. Id. at 556.
242. Id.
243. 571 So. 2d 83, 84.
244. Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528, 532 n.6 (Fla. 1993).
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that the public is fed up with the problem of juvenile crime and has
adopted a get-tough attitude is that it feels that past efforts at rehabilitat-
ing juveniles have not worked and continue to fail as evidenced by the
high number of new arrests each year and the high percentage of
rearrests.245
When one looks at the types of juveniles being arrested and rear-
rested, it is easy to see that the conditions which contribute to their com-
mission of crimes include negative peer pressure, lack of education and
an absence of other more stable and constructive forces such as families,
neighborhoods and churches.246 These juveniles are exactly the kind of
children who need educational and vocational skills and counseling so
that they do not feel a need to commit crimes in order to survive on the
streets or make a living.
Presently, about two thousand spaces are available in Florida pro-
grams for juvenile offenders.247 In Dade County there are only about
two hundred spaces available at any one time for juvenile offenders
adjudicated delinquent and ordered to a juvenile facility. 248 In 1991
over 250 juveniles were adjudicated delinquent in Dade County for vio-
lent crimes, and approximately one thousand for property crimes.249
Currently, the placement facilities for juvenile offenders in Dade
County range from "Level Two" facilities to "Level Eight" facilities.
"Level Two" is the lowest level of placement for juvenile offenders.
These facilities usually contain minor offenders who commit first and
second degree misdemeanors250 and who do not represent a threat to
public safety because their patterns of offending are infrequent and non-
violent.2 5' These facilities are nonresidential and community-based
programs. 252
In Dade County, there are two types of "Level Two" facilities. The
Associated Marine Institutes ("AMI") is a nonprofit organization that
utilizes a marine science environment to promote social rehabilitation
245. See, e.g., Diane Hirth, Session to Focus on Crime Legislators to Hear Cures for Violence,
SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 6, 1994, at 1A.
246. Judge Tom Petersen, Juvenile Justice and Captain Scott's Children: Searching for a
Solution to an Urban Dilemma 22 (Oct. 30, 1993) (unpublished report, on file with the author).
247. Woodrow W. Harper, Department of Juvenile Justice Program Office, Summary of
Juvenile Justice Programs (Dec. 30, 1993) (unpublished report, on file with the author).
248. Id. at 4-5.
249. Statistics from The Metro Dade Department of Justice Assistance, Dade Justice
Improvement Model (on file with the author).
250. Id. at 6. Examples of these misdemeanors include: resisting arrest with or without
violence, FLA. STAT. § 843.02 (West Supp. 1994); criminal mischief, FLA. STAT. § 806.13 (1994);
petit theft, FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d) (1994); unnatural and lascivious behavior, FLA. STAT.
§ 800.02 (1992).
251. Harper, supra note 247, at 6.
252. Id.
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and educational and vocational instruction.25 3 This program is open to
both males and females from ages fifteen to eighteen.254 AMI's current
total capacity is about seventy juveniles. Other Dade County "Level
Two" programs are Treatment Alternative for Youth Centers (TRY).
Juveniles attend these centers during the day for intensive individual
family and group counseling and also participate in educational and
vocational programs.2 5 Miami TRY has the capacity for about twenty
juveniles. 256
"Level Four" facilities are residential, community-based commit-
ment programs for low-risk offenders.25 7 The length of stay at these
facilities can range anywhere from one month to six months.258 One
"Level Four" facility exists in Dade County: the Dade Group Treatment
Home, which houses about twenty-five juveniles.259 Juvenile offenses at
this level range from first-degree misdemeanors to third-degree felo-
nies.2 61 In addition, first-time second-degree felony offenders may be
placed here if the court determines that'they do not represent a risk to the
public safety.26'
"Level Six" facilities are moderate-risk, residential, community-
based commitment programs in which juveniles spend from three to nine
months.262  The offenders placed here have committed second- and
third-degree felonies and represent a moderate risk to public safety.263
These facilities are usually physically secure. 2 " In Dade County, there
are currently four "Level Six" halfway houses, each holding about
twenty juveniles.265
"Level Eight" facilities, the highest risk residential programs, are
physically secure.266 Offenders placed here have had prior adjudications
for major property offenses, assaultive felony offenses and may have
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id. at 4.
255. Id. at 7.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id. at 6.
258. HRS computer printout on current programs for juvenile offenders (Feb. 1993, on file
with the author).
259. See Harper, supra note 247, at 4.
260. Id. at 6. Usually the first-degree misdemeanor offenders have performed unsuccessfully
in their prior programs. Id. Third-degree felonies include: theft of a motor vehicle, FLA. STAT.
§ 812.014(2)(c)(4) (Supp. 1994); aggravated assault, FLA. STAT. § 784.021(2) (1992).
261. Harper, supra note 247, at 6. Second degree felonies include: dealing in stolen property,
FLA. STAT. § 812.019(!) (Supp. 1994); loitering or prowling, FLA. STAT. 856.021 (1976); assault,
FLA. STAT. § 784.011(2) (1992); aggravated battery, FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (1992).
262. Harper, supra note 247, at 6.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id. at 6.
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had numerous prior placements in lower-level programs. 267 The time
spent in these facilities ranges anywhere from six to twelve months.268
Currently there is one "Level Eight" facility in Dade County. Eckerd
Youth Development Center is the only Florida training school, other
than Dozier Training School in northern Florida, that provides counsel-
ing, treatment, vocational and educational training, and work programs
for violent juvenile offenders.269 Eckerd, located in Okeechobee, Flor-
ida, is the facility used for southern Florida generally, and currently has
a capacity of about 130 beds.270 In addition to the training schools, there
are other Level Eight programs located outside Dade County, including
the Broward Control Treatment Center (a residential treatment program
for girls),271 the Elaine Gordon Sex Offender Program,272 boot camps, 2 7 3
serious habitual offender programs, 274 and the Hillsborough Alternative
Residential Program. 275  Generally, space for juvenile offenders from
Dade County is limited, if it exists at all.
Programs which provide diversion from judicial handling offer
alternatives to these commitment programs. One of these programs is
the Juvenile Alternative Services Program ("JASP") which provides
community service, restitution, and individual or family counseling.276
Community control is another alternative to judicial handling. 277 Under
this program, an HRS Delinquency Case Manager provides supervision
and support services to juvenile offenders to make sure that their sanc-
tions are carried out.278 In 1992, almost twenty-eight thousand juveniles
received community control.279
Tom Petersen, a Dade County Juvenile Court Judge, explored the
problem of juvenile crime and the ways in which Dade County currently
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 5; see also Siegel, supra note 52, at 695-96 for a brief history on the Eckerd Youth
Development Center.
271. Harper, supra note 247, at 5. The capacity of this facility is about 20. Id.
272. Id. The capacity for juveniles at this facility is about 20. Id.
273. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.057 (3) (1993):
A child may be placed in a boot camp program if he is at least 14 years of age but
less than 18 years of age at the time of adjudication and has been committed to the
department for: (a) a capital, life, first degree or second degree felony; or (b) a third
degree felony with two or more prior felony adjudications, of which one or more
resulted in a residential commitment.
274. Harper, supra note 247, at 6. The capacity is about 20 spaces. Id.
275. Id. at 6. The capacity in this facility is about 20. Id.
276. Id. at 12.
277. Id. at 14.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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deals with its juvenile offenders.28 0 He focused mainly on the effects of
the juvenile justice system on the children of the approximately nine
hundred families who live in the Scott Housing Project, which has the
highest crime rate in Dade County.28' Three out of four males from this
project have been referred to the juvenile justice system at least once.28 2
Judge Petersen chose the Scott Housing Project based on his belief that
"if the juvenile justice system is to exist, it must work in places like the
Scott homes. 28 3 After interviewing various kids in the project, Judge
Petersen came to the conclusion that the current community programs
funded by Dade County, such as the Juvenile Justice Alternative Sanc-
tions Systems ("JASS"), do not work.28 4 This may be due to the fact
that the kids rarely participate in this program, and, when they do, they
fail to participate successfully. 285 The community control programs are
also ineffective because the contacts between the juveniles and the inner
city workers are infrequent and, if they do occur, violations such as skip-
ping school are not reported to the courts because of all the time it takes
to actually get back into court.2"6 If the juveniles are called back into
court, in most instances nothing happens to them anyway.28 7
Judge Petersen also received responses from the interviewees about
the commitment programs, like the halfway houses. Those interviewed
responded that they were "essentially worthless experiences. ' 288 In con-
trast, youths that participated in programs such as the Dade Marine Insti-
tute reported very positive experiences.289
Interviews with those kids who were involuntarily transferred to
adult court supported Judge Petersen's hypothesis that referral into the
adult system generally results in
'a four-and-two' (meaning four years incarceration in a youthful
offender adult facility followed by two years probation) and that
since one serves at best one-third of an incarceration sentence, with
credit for time served while awaiting sentencing, the youth is back on
the street in about a year.290
In addition, because these youths return from the adult court with the
280. Petersen, supra note 246.
281. Id. at 6.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 4.
284. Id. at 10-12. JASS is a diversion program that is an alternative to dealing with juveniles
through the courts.
285. Id. at 100.
286. Id. at 11.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 12.
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same problems that got them there in the first place (i.e., no skills, edu-
cation or job), they end up violating their probation by stealing to sur-
vive, and thus find themselves back in jail again.29'
After concluding that the juvenile justice system does not work-
where in fact it must if its existence is to be justified292-Judge Peterson
put forth many positive ideas to improve the juvenile justice system in
Dade County.29 3 His ideas include:
1) Making a shift from the mental health model which dominates all
public delinquency programs to a sociological model that would
identify peer pressure and educational deficits as the primary
causes of delinquency (especially in the inner city).2 94
2) Making a shift from community probation programs that make
kids perform tasks such as community service and cleaning parks
to programs where time would be spent with educational tutors;295
3) Having more of the nonresidential programs that have proven to
be highly successful (such as AMI) available at earlier stages,
rather than only making them available to higher level offend-
ers.296 To accomplish this, more programs of this type would
have to be implemented and the current ones would need to be
expanded; 297 and,
4) Having more locked facilities for violent juvenile offenders who
need to reside in secure facilities for the safety of the public.298
Instead of giving up on the juvenile justice system as most people
have (admittedly for valid reasons in its current state of existence), more
money should be invested in clever and innovative ways to help
juveniles put their lives back on track. An example of a program that
has proved to be effective in Dade County is the TROY ("Teaching and
Rehabilitating Our Youth") Community Academy. 299 To compel
attendance, this Academy is housed in two trailers outside the Juvenile
Justice Center.300 In addition to attending school from nine to five
o'clock, the juveniles work one day a week at the Teen Cuisine Restau-
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 22-34.
294. Id. at 23.
295. Id. at 24.
296. Id. at 26.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 30. Because the facility in Okeechobee, Florida is the only locked facility, juveniles
sent to halfway houses think that these houses are a joke because they are "only half locked." Id.
at 17. This leads the public to believe that the kids are being taken off the streets when in fact they
are not. Id. at 30. The average juvenile stays at the halfway house about 27 days before running
away. At any given day, 37% of the juveniles are on runaway status. Id. at 17.
299. Id. at 30.
300. Id. at 28.
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rant in the Juvenile Justice Center, and can earn from thirty to fifty dol-
lars per week.30 1  The school contains mostly hard-core juveniles,
currently has about an eighty percent attendance rate and has proved to
be highly successful. 30 2 This success can be attributed to the motivated
staff and the challenging curriculum that makes the juveniles want to
attend. Moreover, since it is right outside the juvenile court, the court
knows immediately if they do not come. 30 3
Although the failure of the juvenile justice system can be attributed
to no more than the lack of attention, money, and hope given to it in the
past, critics seeking to abolish it remain.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE
ARGUMENT FOR ITS ABOLISHMENT
This desire to eliminate the juvenile justice system is not new.
Since the 1970s both conservative and liberal commentators have criti-
cized the continued existence of a separate legal system for juveniles. 3°4
Some scholars have concluded that because the rehabilitative philosophy
of the juvenile court system has started to fade, the juvenile justice sys-
tem should also.305 Some seek to eliminate juvenile court jurisdiction
based on the offense,30 6 while others seek to eliminate the system based
on the offender's age.307
Barry Feld, who has written numerous articles on the juvenile jus-
tice system,30 8 has proposed abolishing juvenile courts on the theory that
it would be more desirable for both juveniles and society. 30 9 He argues
that because of the transformation of the juvenile court from "an infor-
mal, rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down, second-class criminal
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. E.g., Martin Guggenheim, A Call to Abolish the Juvenile Justice System, CHILDREN'S RTs.
RaP., June 1978; Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Challenging the Rehabilitative Justification for
Indeterminate sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The Right to Punishment, 21 ST. Louis
U. L.J., 12 (1977).
305. See Feld, supra note 20.
306. Feld, supra note 82.
307. Barbara Boland & James Q. Wilson, Age, Crime & Punishment, 51 PuB. INTEREST 22, 34
(1978).
308. E.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Meets The Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes
in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987); Barry C. Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it
Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the
Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, 65 MINN. L. Rv. 167 (1981);
Barry C. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative
to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. Rav. 515 (1978).
309. See Feld, supra note 20.
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court, [there is no longer] any reason to maintain a separate punitive
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting procedural defi-
ciencies." 3 10 The procedural deficiencies that Feld speaks of result from
holdings such as Gault, Winship, and McKeiver, which started the trend
toward procedural safeguards for juveniles.311
Since Gault, most of the procedures of criminal courts are supposed
to be employed in the juvenile court as well. "[B]oth courts apply the
same laws of arrest, search, identification, and interrogatories to adults
and juveniles, and increasingly subject juveniles charged with felony
offenses to similar fingerprinting and booking processes as adults. 312
Although, theoretically, the procedural safeguards in juvenile court
resemble those protections afforded in adult courts, Feld argues that
juveniles, in reality, rarely receive the justice that most adults insist
upon.313 He sees the deficiencies as emerging from four developments
since Gault. Specifically, these developments are: (1) removal of status
offenders; (2) waiving serious offenders; (3) increased punitiveness in
sentencing; and (4) more formal procedures which have transformed the
juvenile court, but not reformed it. 314
Professor Feld and other critics believe that if children were tried in
criminal court, rationales would develop to give them special protection
when guilt and punishment are ascertained. 3 5 These rationales would
include giving a "youth discount" to juveniles tried in adult court so that
they would invariably receive shorter sentences.31 6 Further, the practice
of expunging records, restoring civil rights and the common law's
infancy defense (which presumes that children below the age of fourteen
lack criminal capacity), would serve to protect juveniles more fully than
the juvenile court does presently. 3' 7
Other scholars have responded to this "procedural deficiency" argu-
ment by stating that the disparity in procedural and constitutional protec-
tion between adult and juvenile courts is not enough to justify its
abolishment.1 8 If juveniles were to be tried in adult courts it is possible
that their immaturity and vulnerability would not be taken into account
310. Id. at 403.
311. See supra notes accompanying part II.A. for a discussion on Winship and McKeiver and
the rights they have afforded to juveniles.
312. Feld, supra note 20, at 419.
313. Id. at 419-20.
314. Id. at 406.
315. See also Ainsworth, supra note 20, at 1131; Federle, supra note 20, at 50-51.
316. Feld, supra note 20, at 418-19.
317. Id. at 419-20.
318. See Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, Wis. L. REv. 163 (1993).
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when sentences are determined and culpability is assessed. 31 9 Despite
Feld's argument that the common law infancy defense still stands, it is
doubtful whether courts would ultimately treat juveniles differently than
adults. After all, trying a juvenile would hold little meaning if juveniles
were given these enhanced safeguards.3 20
One procedural safeguard that has been struck down by the courts
is the right to jury trial. 321 Because today a number of state laws grant
this right independently, 32 2 and because relatively few trials by jury
actually take place compared to the number of cases in which charges
are filed, the right to a jury "ends up primarily being a chip to be used in
the poker game of plea bargaining," and is, thus, not a major loss to
juveniles.323 In the end, the few distinctions between adult and juvenile
procedures become almost inconsequential since safeguards available in
the criminal courts are often not upheld.324 These low levels of constitu-
tional protections for adults seem insignificant when ninety percent of
defendants plead guilty anyway.325
Barbara Boland and James Q. Wilson argue that the current two-
track system (one for juveniles and one for adults) should be abolished,
at least for serious repeat offenders. 326 Their theory is based on the
notion that having a two-track system means that the heaviest punish-
ment falls on offenders at or near the end of their criminal careers.327
Since crime commission declines with age,328 this type of punishment
rationale leaves adult prisoners feeling the criminal justice system is
unfair and young offenders believing it is irrelevant. 329 Boland and Wil-
son suggest that if there are going to be two tracks, these tracks should
be defined by the nature of the criminal career and not the age of the
offender.330 One system could deal with routine, intermittent offenders,
319. Id. at 175-80.
320. Id. at 175.
321. Id. at 169.
322. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
323. Id. at 169.
324. Id. at 171-72.
325. Id. at 172.
326. Boland & Wilson, supra note 307, at 33.
327. Id. at 29.
328. They theorize:
That young males commit more crimes than older males is a well-established
criminological fact, and there are any number of theories-most quite plausible, and
few mutually exclusive--as to why this should be so. Youth is a period when
energy is abundant, adult authority is suspect, and peer group reputation important.
Young people develop passions and seek independence, expressing both in music,
dress, sex, and occasionally crime.
Id. at 26.
329. Id. at 31-32.
330. Id. at 34.
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or those with short criminal records, and the other with serious, intensive
offenders.331
Other critics of the juvenile justice system argue that a child has a
right to be punished, not a right to be treated.332 This notion is based on
two premises: (1) that treatment does not work because there is no sure-
fire way, short of killing someone, to stop a person from committing a
crime; and, (2) the idea that a treatment and rehabilitation orientated
justice system has great potential for abuse.333 Robert E. Shepherd Jr.
bases his argument for a "right to punishment" on the notion that
although the justification for a separate juvenile system is to avoid the
harshness of the adult system, the emphasis on rehabilitation in the juve-
nile system has "fostered the imposition of indeterminate sentences. 334
This has resulted in juveniles being incarcerated for much longer terms
than adults who are sentenced for similar offenses. Shepherd also
believes that punishment should be emphasized over treatment because
the broad discretionary powers of the juvenile court overshadow the
availability of its benefits. 335 This argument, however, does not hold
true everywhere. In Florida, overcrowding in both juvenile and adult
facilities has resulted in juveniles rarely spending over a year in any
facility, regardless of their crime.336
V. CONCLUSION
Get-tough mechanisms which subject juveniles to bearing full adult
responsibility are clearly in conflict with the original rehabilitative phi-
losophy of the juvenile justice system.337 These mechanisms are in con-
flict with theories about adolescence and furthermore, deprive juveniles
of the special privileges to which they are entitled due to their status.
The get-tough mentality strikes against generally accepted policies that
have governed the legal and social status of juveniles. These policies
gradually increase the opportunity for juveniles to exhibit independence
and to exercise freedom and judgment.
The transition from childhood to adulthood is a developmental pro-
cess. Children mature at different rates, in response to hereditary and
331. Id.
332. Sanford J. Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment, 25 Juv.
JUST. 2 (1974); Shepherd, supra note 304.
333. Fox, supra note 332, at 3.
334. Robert E. Shepherd Jr. is director of the Youth Advocacy Clinic at the University of
Richmond School of Law. See Shepherd, supra note 304, at 14.
335. Id. at 28.
336. See supra part III.A.3.
337. For a history on the adoption of "a right to treatment" for incarcerated juveniles, see
Shepherd, supra note 304, at 21-25.
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environmental factors. Some juveniles may be very mature at fourteen,
while others are extremely immature at eighteen. Franklin E. Zinring
has termed the gradual exposure of adolescents to adult rights as a
"learning permit. '3 8  The sequential phasing in of adult rights and
related responsibilities based on age is how society moves youth toward
adulthood and full maturity. 339 It is evident that responsibility is not the
product of a single event or act, but is a process based on a range of
experiences.
For example, there are social rights that are not dictated by laws,
but are instead formed within the family structure. These include such
notions as the time for a juvenile to be home at night, the age a juvenile
is able to start going out alone, dating, etc.340 There are also rights that
are dictated by law. In Florida, a juvenile must be sixteen years of age
or older to drive.341 At fifteen, however, one can drive with a driver's
permit under certain restrictions to become accustomed to the idea of
driving.342 In order to vote,343 sit on a jury,3 " or purchase pornographic
materials, 345 one must be eighteen years of age. To purchase and con-
sume alcohol one must be twenty-one years of age or older.346 All of
these rights come about in sequence to allow adolescents to take on new
tasks and accept responsibility gradually. Juveniles' rights are dimin-
ished because we have long recognized that they have diminished culpa-
bility.347 If we recognize this, we should also allow juveniles to have
diminished accountability for their actions. They should be held respon-
sible, but not to the same extent as adults.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,s48 the Supreme Court reiterated its view
that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile
than to a crime committed by an adult.3 49 The Court confronted the
question of whether the execution of Thompson, a fifteen-year-old who
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, would vio-
late the Constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unu-
sual punishment.35 °
338. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89 (1982).
339. Id. at 108-10.
340. Id. at 108.
341. FLA. STAT. § 322.05 (Supp. 1994).
342. FLA. STAT. § 322.05 (Supp. 1994).
343. FLA. STAT. § 97.041(1)(a) (1993).
344. FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1994).
345. FLA. STAT. § 847.012 (Supp. 1994).
346. FLA. STAT. § 562.111 (Supp. 1994).
347. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
348. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
349. Id. at 823.
350. Id.
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In holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited
the execution of a person who was under sixteen years of age at the time
of his or her offense,35' the Court relied on the notion that juveniles
deserve reduced culpability.352 The Court stressed that it had already
endorsed, on several occasions, the proposition that less culpability
should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult. To be sure, less experience, education,
and maturity may make a teenager unable to evaluate the consequences
of his or her conduct and more likely to be motivated by mere emotion
or peer pressure than an adult.353 This lesser culpability makes the
retributive purpose underlying the death penalty inappropriate for a fif-
teen-year-old. 4 In making this determination, the Court relied on legis-
lative history, designating the maximum age for juvenile court
jurisdiction at no less than sixteen. 5  The Court stated this "is consis-
tent with the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our
law that the normal fifteen year old is not prepared to assume the full
responsibilities of an adult. 35 6
It is important to note that the mechanisms which permit the prose-
cutor to select the forum have not been reliable in preserving juvenile
benefits for those who are entitled to them. Juvenile offenders enjoy
special privileges which are not shared by adults. Along with the treat-
ment function of the juvenile system, juvenile offenders are adjudicated
"delinquent" rather than "convicted," thus a conviction is prohibited
from appearing on their records and being subsequently used against
them.357 Juveniles are also sheltered from publicity, due to the policy of
confidentiality in the juvenile court .3 5  This confidentiality results in a
diminished stigma and allows juveniles the opportunity to get a job and
start over without their past mistakes being held against them. The pos-
sibility that juveniles might lose these benefits as a result of a waiver
decision caused the Supreme Court to note in the Kent decision that this
issue is "critically important," stating that there "is no place in our sys-
351. Id. at 838.
352. Id. at 834-35.
353. Id. at 835.
354. Id. at 836-37.
355. Id. at 824.
356. Id. at 824-25.
357. FLA. STAT. 39.053(4) (1994) provides: "An adjudication of delinquency by a court with
respect to any child who has committed a delinquent act or violation of law shall not be deemed a
conviction; nor shall the child be deemed to have been found guilty or to be a criminal by reason
of that adjudication."
358. FLA. STAT. 39.045 (1994) provides: "The court shall preserve the records pertaining to a
child charged with committing a delinquent act or violation of law until he reaches 24 years of age
or reaches 26 of age if he is a serious or habitual offender ... and may then destroy them."
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tern of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences with-
out ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,
without a statement of reasons. 359
The juvenile system is not a place for every juvenile who engages
in illegal behavior. Some misbehaving or rebelling juveniles do not
belong in any court. Others, who commit major crimes of violence or
who are serious chronic offenders, may be beyond the control of the
juvenile court. Conceding that there are, and will continue to be, some
juveniles who are not amenable to treatment, judicial waiver should be
the means used for transferring a child to adult court. This will result in
an individual analysis of each juvenile's case to assure that the juvenile
receives proper treatment so as to benefit himself and society.
"Getting smart" will require the public to become more aware of
the laws that currently govern juveniles and to become more involved in
the legislative process. Although outrage about juveniles committing
crimes with more frequency is understandable, rather than just giving up
on today's juveniles by supporting a "lock-'em up" attitude, those con-
cerned with the escalating crime rate should instead support preventative
measures by looking at ways that will help ease juvenile crime rates.
More important, the legislature needs to devote more money to crime
prevention rather than to building more prisons. Such an investment in
today's youth and their families can make the need for future long-term
incarceration programs unnecessary. Indeed, prisons have failed to
return juveniles (and adult criminals), to the community as productive
members of society. In sum, to direct money to the construction of new
prisons is simply an investment that offers only a low-rate of return for
those juveniles who desperately need "get smart" solutions to the
problems of today's juvenile justice system.
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